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Editorial
Informationstechnik bildet die Basis systemtechnischer Innovationen in Industrie, Wirt-
schaft und Wissenschaft, aber auch in fast allen anderen Bereichen des öffentlichen und
privaten Lebens. Um die hierfür erforderlichen vielfältigen Informationstechnologien
in Lehre und Forschung bedarfsgerecht zu integrieren, haben sich Wissenschaftler der
technischen Universität Clausthal über Fakultätsgrenzen hinweg zum Informationstech-
nischen Zentrum zusammengeschlossen.
Durch enge Zusammenarbeit des Informationstechnischen Zentrums mit den natur-
und ingenieurwissenschaftlichen Instituten stellt die TU Clausthal der Industrie das
heute so notwendige fächerübergreifende Expertenwissen für die Erarbeitung komple-
xer, prozessintegrierter Systemlösungen in einem weit gefächerten Gebiet zur Verfü-
gung.
Ziel der Berichte des Informationstechnischen Zentrums (ITZ Berichte) ist es, Beiträ-
ge über wissenschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse und Entwicklungen vornehmlich aus
Instituten der TU Clausthal aus Bereichen wie formale Systeme der Informatik, wis-
sensbasierte Systeme, Bildverarbeitung und -analyse, Mehrrechnersysteme, Computer
Aided Engineering, Mess- und Automatisierungstechnik, Elektrotechnik, Prozessleit-
technik zu veröffentlichen und damit einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu ma-
chen. Insbesondere sind dies
• Forschungsarbeiten und Berichte über Projekte, Entwicklungen, Fallstudien,
• eingeladene Beiträge von außerhalb,
• Tagungs- und Workshopberichte,
• Dissertationen.
Bei der Veröffentlichung von Beiträgen wird auf ein zeitaufwendiges Referentensys-
tem weitgehend verzichtet, um Forschungsergebnisse mit minimaler Verzögerung und
dementsprechend hoher Aktualität herausbringen zu können.
Die Herausgeber
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Preface 
This work deals with the requirements, conception and implementation of a framework, 
which provides a platform and starting point for the development of a peer-to-peer net-
work empowered by mobile agents. Peer-to-Peer networks like Napster, Kazaa etc. have 
reached a widespread use in the Internet. The idea is to deploy mobile agents, which can 
travel between network nodes, to a large Peer-to-Peer network. Doing this people could 
use the peer-to-peer technology for all kind of services like anonymizing network traf-
fic, distributed storage of documents, for replicating contents of heavily accessed Inter-
net sites, trading of information etc. For many of these things there are solutions avail-
able but by using a common framework there might be the opportunity to access all 
kinds of information through a common application programming interface which guar-
antees extensibility and widespread use. Mobile agents can be used to plug in new func-
tionality into the system without forcing upgrades on users’ computers thereby allowing 
new applications to be deployed immediately over the network. This project has been 
conducted in collaboration between the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) and 
the Technical University of Clausthal (Department Business Informatics). 
Das vorliegende Werk behandelt die Entwicklung und Implementierung eines Frame-
works für Peer-to-Peer-Netzwerke, in denen mobile Agenten eingesetzt werden können. 
Peer-to-Peer-Netzwerke - wie Napster, Kazaa etc. - erfreuen sich heutzutage im Internet 
großer Beliebtheit. Die grundlegende Idee ist es nun solche Systeme um mobile Agen-
ten, die zwischen Rechnerknoten wandern können, zu erweitern, um so beliebig und 
flexibel neue Funktionalität in das Netzwerk einbringen zu können, ohne dabei die 
Software auf den einzelnen Rechnerknoten aktualisieren zu müssen. Diese Agenten 
können dann Dienste, wie z.B. Anonymisierung, verteilte Datenhaltung, um häufig be-
nutzte Daten zu replizieren etc., anbieten. Für einzelne Dienste gibt es bereits heutzuta-
ge Insellösungen. Durch den Einsatz eines gemeinsamen Frameworks können diese 
Dienste über gemeinsame und genormte Schnittstellen angeboten werden, welche die 
weitere Verbreitung und den leichteren Einsatz unterstützen. Das Projekt wurde in Zu-
sammenarbeit zwischen der Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) und der TU 
Clausthal (Institut für Informatik, Arbeitsgruppe Wirtschaftsinformatik) durchgeführt. 
Die Autoren sind jederzeit für Kritik und Anregungen dankbar. Diese können per  
E-mail an folgende Adressen: gomez@in.tu-clausthal.de oder auch daniel.luebke@tu-
clausthal.de gerichtet werden. 
Jorge Marx Gómez         Daniel Lübke 
Clausthal, im März 2004 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Peer-to-Peer-Networks usage has been increasing in the last years. Especially file-
sharing networks like Kazaa, online chats like ICQ and distributed computing networks 
like seti@home have become increasingly popular. Today, more than 2.7 million people 
are using the Kazaa network, which is only one of the available peer-to-peer applica-
tions (see Redshift Research (2003)). Peer-to-Peer-Networks are so popular because 
they allow the easy aggregation of distributed resources like storage space as well as 
processing power. Additionally modern clients are very user-friendly and due to their 
open nature, they allow everyone to join the network and benefit from it. The principle 
of these networks is quite easy: when everyone shares, all will profit. 
However, peer-to-peer-networks so far are dependent on their own protocol and their 
own clients. Thus, no network exists, where all users can join and use all kinds of ser-
vices like Instant Messaging or File Sharing. Furthermore, if users today want to use a 
specific functionality, they have to install a new client; the same is valid for each new 
software- or network-update. This includes, that the systems are not interoperable: For 
example users of ICQ cannot directly communicate with users of the MSN Messenger 
although both applications are instant messaging systems. 
To avoid this problem, it is necessary to take care of deploying code over a peer-to-
peer-network. This should be done in such a way, that the traditional client becomes a 
facility to accept code, execute it and manage the network's functionality, like browsing 
resources, keep connections to peers and provide basic message passing. In order to be 
successful, this client has to be easy to use and easy to install. Therefore solutions, 
where complete web servers are used to process requests, like LOO suggested (see Loo 
(2003)), are not satisfying. 
1.2 Problem definition and objectives 
The challenge today is to bring the required logic into one unified peer-to-peer-network. 
Mobile code as well as mobile agents is a good solution to address this problem. But at 
this point there are neither research results nor implementations available which address 
all issues. This especially includes security, performance and scalability. 
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Therefore, the long-term goal is to build a peer-to-peer-network whose protocol is scal-
able and completely decentralized: No central name- or resource-services should exist, 
because they can be used to control the network, monitor traffic or expose other kinds of 
control over the network. Instead, users shall be able to send broadcasts through the 
network for finding resources etc. To bring the functionality into the system the ap-
proach of mobile agents, as outlined by LÜBKE AND MARX GÓMEZ (see Lübke (2003)), 
is used: The peer-to-peer client shall only provide a network component, a user-
interface for monitoring the application and initiate requests into the network and a run-
time environment, in which mobile agents can be executed. 
Mobile agents are transferable pieces of software which can solve tasks and travel 
through the network autonomously. Normally they are deployed in so called sea-of-data 
applications, in which data is distributed over lots of systems or may not leave the sys-
tems due to privacy concerns or other security restrictions, like medical data in hospi-
tals. Research to such systems has been done intensively, but only under the premise 
that central security policies and control can be established. An example for such archi-
tectures is MARISM-A1. However, a public peer-to-peer-network is a different scenario, 
requiring other security strategies and leading to other problems. But mobile agents are 
a good solution for adding functionality, because new functionality can be introduced 
by simply writing and deploying new mobile agents, which will roam the peer-to-peer 
network searching for specific data or doing calculations on the user's behalf. Further-
more, agents may roam the network while the user's peer is offline, making it very at-
tractive for emerging technologies like UMTS, with much higher connection fees than 
with traditional connection types. 
All in all, this means that the peer-to-peer-network and its protocol are not restricted to a 
single use-case. Instead, all kinds of applications, from instant messaging over distrib-
uted computing to file sharing and collaboration software can utilize the new network 
infrastructure. Possibly, new applications will be created, we do not know of today. 
This work aims to provide the first necessary step towards this kind of peer-to-peer-
network empowered by mobile agents: 
The first objective is to provide a framework for general peer-to-peer applications using 
mobile agents. The framework captures the design, which was developed during this 
project and introduces basic security concepts, specifically designed for the use in open, 
untrusted networks. To be used for developing, testing and profiling certain parts of a 
peer-to-peer-network implementation individually, the different functionality domains 
                                                 
1 MARISM-A can be found in the WWW under http://www.marisma.org 
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shall be loosely coupled2. This way it is possible to design a networking protocol and 
test how it performs without touching or interfering with other parts of the application 
like agent-development. 
To make further development easier, the framework has to be intensively documented 
and must provide basic implementations and examples. The basic implementations 
should provide a starting point for improving the system, so that programmers can con-
centrate on their part without needing to care about others. However, it is not possible to 
provide an implementation which is suitable for all kind of real-world applications. An 
analysis of the strength and drawbacks of the given approaches and implementation 
suggestions will be made during this work. 
Besides the software-design, the second objective is to develop an integrated security-
concept: It is based on a decentralised trust-model, allowing each user to establish his 
security policies as well as supporting the development of anonymous applications. The 
utilized standard is OpenPGP which has been used in e-mail communications for a long 
time. Some extensions have to be made which are implemented as simple add-on files 
transferred with the agents, thus not breaking the standard but providing the needed 
functionality. 
1.3 Structure 
This document is structured as follows: 
After this introduction, which discusses the goals and the structure, the second chapter 
introduces and defines all expressions and terms used in this document. It is meant to 
define all vocabulary used and explain the base-techniques required to understand the 
overall concept and the involved technology. 
The third chapter describes the security model and transport standard developed to se-
cure the use of mobile agents and provide authentication for the agents. 
The fourth chapter provides a short overview of the development model used and thus, 
how design decisions were made. Its purpose is to illustrate which way and for which 
purpose some designs were favoured over others and how the framework was created. 
The following chapters all describe a certain step in the development and thus the re-
sults for specific sub-processes. 
                                                 
2 Loosely coupled means that there are as few as possible dependencies between the system’s components 
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In chapter five the requirements for the framework are illustrated. These requirements 
will be important for the development of the framework. 
In the sixth chapter the framework itself is described. This includes an overview about 
the framework, a specific view into certain pieces and a description and discussion of 
the basic implementation as a part of the framework. 
The seventh chapter gives implementation suggestions for specific problems thus show-
ing the general concept of implementing applications by using the framework and the 
flexibility offered by it. 
The eighth chapter presents a sample application for anonymizing web-traffic by using 
mobile agents for implementing the networking-logic. The sample application is pro-
vided as a proof-of-concept for both the framework's design and the basic implementa-
tion provided with it. 
Finally, conclusions as well as an outlook of what topics might be interesting for future 
research, are given in the last chapter. 
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2 Definitions 
2.1 Terms of Object-Oriented Programming 
An object-oriented system is composed of objects. An object consists of both data and 
methods. Methods are the actual operations which can perform actions on the data 
which are representing the object's internal state. In a well designed system the internal 
state can only be modified by calling methods. The internal state including the imple-
mentation details is unknown to the caller. This principle is called encapsulation and is 
important for decoupling the system. Internal algorithms and data structures as well as 
data storage can be easily changed when the caller treats an object like a black box and 
does not rely on a specific implementation. This led to the principle “program to an in-
terface” (see Magee (2003)) where a programmer is not allowed to make any assump-
tions about implementation details. 
The methods are identified by their signature. The signature consists of a method's 
name, the method’s parameters’ types, and the method’s return value. Notable is that 
most programming languages are stricter: the method's name and its parameter must be 
unique; the return value is often not part of the signature. For instance, in Java™ fol-
lowing two methods cannot belong to the same object, because they have the same 
Java™-signature: 
• public void setValue(int value); 
• public boolean setValue(int value); 
However following methods are possible, because their parameter types are different: 
• public void setValue(int value); 
• public void setValue(String value); 
If a method has the same name (setValue) but different parameter types, the method is 
called an overloaded method. All signatures of an object are called the object's interface. 
A type is a name for a particular interface. An object A has a special type T if all method 
signatures of T are contained in A's interface. For example an object representing a stu-
dent is likely to have all methods which are required by the type person. 
By strictly referring the object's interfaces the black box usage is mandatory because the 
internal representation, e.g. the data, should not be part of an interface. If methods of an 
interface are called, it's up to the object's implementation how these requests are served. 
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The implementation of any object is defined in its class. The class specifies all inter-
faces it adheres to and implements all methods as well as internal data structures. 
An object is created by instantiating a class. An object might therefore also be called in 
instance of a class. Only by instantiating an object any resources like memory will be 
allocated. There may be as many objects of a class as the local resources permit. Each of 
these objects has its own internal state. That means each object has its own set of vari-
ables and is not influenced by methods executed on other objects. 
Classes can be inherited from other classes. If class A inherits from class B, class A is 
also called a subclass of class B. Both classes share the same implementation of the 
methods, however the subclass may override a method or add new methods but may not 
drop any methods. Overriding means that the subclass specifies a different implementa-
tion for a method. 
Whenever this method is called, the overridden implementation will be executed, re-
gardless of the interface through which this call was conducted.  This behaviour is 
called polymorphism and provides a lot of flexibility to the software designer. 
A special case of an class is the abstract class. It is a class which implements an inter-
face only partly but specifies method signatures which have to be implemented by sub-
classes. Because the implementation is not complete, no object may be instantiated from 
an abstract class. Abstract classes are often used to provide an interface as well as a de-
fault or common implementation for the classes which are using it. 
2.2 Design Patterns 
A pattern definition used for patterns in towns and buildings, but also matches the soft-
ware patterns comes from CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER: “Each pattern describes a prob-
lem which occurs over and over again in our environment and then describes the core of 
the solution of that problem, in such a way that you can use this solution a million times 
over, without oever doing it the same way twice.“ (see Gamma (2001), p. 2) 
Since “designing software is hard and designing reusable object-oriented software is 
even harder“ (see Gamma (2001), p. 1) people are trying to further simplify the software 
design process. 
Many problems are reoccurring quite often in different facets. Consequently the idea 
was born to abstract the common problems and nail them down to their important prop-
erties, like design of hierarchical systems, object creation etc. as was done within archi-
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tecture long before. Solutions are then provided for these common problems which have 
been proven in existing software designs and projects. 
A formal definition of a design pattern in the software design process is: “A pattern is 
the abstraction from a concrete form which keeps recurring in specific non-arbitrary 
contexts.”  (Riehle (1996)) 
A pattern description normally consists of 
• pattern name, 
• problem description, 
• proposed solution, and 
• consequences for the design. 
It is important that design patterns deal with how objects should generally behave 
within a given problem context and not to provide answers for implementation prob-
lems like, for example, linked lists. (see Gamma (2001), pp. 3) 
The standard reference for design patterns was written by ERICH GAMMA, RICHARD 
HELM, RALPH JOHNSON and JOHN VLISSIDES and published in their book “Design Pat-
terns“. But especially in the last years there were more publications of design pattern 
catalogues (see Cooper (1998), Grand (1998), Microsoft (2003), Monday (2001), 
Zorgdrager (2001)) and often new patterns and their application are discussed in pro-
gramming related magazines and publications (for example Horton (2003). 
The advantage for programmers and software designers alike is that by referring to 
standard names for standard design elements communication and code clarity can be 
improved. Moreover beginner software architects have a good point for searching initial 
solutions geared towards their problems. 
Although design patterns are often used today, some people have expressed criticism. A 
main point is the so called “pattern trap” which says that it is likely that (inexperienced) 
software designers will not focus on solving a problem in the best way possible any-
more but instead are trying to use as many design patterns as available to have an appar-
ently good design. 
M. J. DOMINUS has another remark: In a short presentation, which he published after-
wards on the web, he expresses that “the design patterns solution is to turn the pro-
grammer into a fancy macro processor” (see Dominus (2002)) because only design tem-
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plates are used over and over again and take lots of creativity from the coder. Also 
many design patterns would address problems which are existent only in old (“1970s-
era”) languages and are solved within newer languages.  
2.3 Frameworks 
A framework consists of interfaces, abstract classes and classes which together make up 
a reusable design for a specific class of problems (see Deutsch (1989) and Johnson 
(1988)). 
The decomposition of the problem is done once and the resulting design expressed and 
implemented in interfaces and classes, can be reused to save time in further projects. 
These projects are realized by customizing these frameworks by implementing and sub-
classing interfaces and abstract classes and plug these into the framework to form a 
whole application. For this, frameworks utilize the polymorphism of object-oriented 
languages. The implementation is provided by the programmers' subclasses although the 
framework executes methods which are required by interfaces and classes within the 
framework itself. 
Frameworks are available for lots of problems like JXTA (see Project JXTA (2003)) for 
developing peer-to-peer-applications or D’Agents (see Darthmouth (2003)) for develop-
ing agent-based systems. 
In contrast to toolkits, frameworks capture the design of an application3 while toolkits 
capture common functionality and implementation like lists, file or database access. 
Toolkits are very common and at least one is usually shipped with the common compil-
ers and development environments, like the GNU C-Library (see GNU (2003)) for most 
C Compilers or the Visual Component Library for Delphi (see Watson (2003)). 
Both design patterns and frameworks try to capture design decisions, document them 
and make them reusable for later use. The main difference between both is the scope 
they have: While frameworks capture an entire design of an application, design patterns 
concentrate of a specific design decision. A framework normally consists of thousands 
of these decisions and often uses solutions which are propagated by design patterns to 
solve them. 
This has some implications: Design patterns are much more general and therefore more 
abstract. Because of this, only examples of design patterns can be embodied in code 
                                                 
3 The application-design comprises all interfaces, abstract classes and classes and their structure of a 
given application 
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while frameworks are written and shipped readily in a programming language (see 
Gamma (2001), p. 28). 
The advantages of using a framework include: 
• Faster development time: Because the software designers and programmers can con-
centrate on the specifics of the application and do not need to care about the design 
because many if not all design decisions have already been done. 
• Similar structures of similar applications: because the framework dictates the design 
all applications which use this framework will automatically have the same or at least 
a very similar design and probably use the same notion within the source and the 
documentation. This makes it easier to maintain these applications and to further util-
ize the skills of programmers and software designers. 
However there are some drawbacks one should be aware of before choosing a frame-
work: 
• Lost control: the control flow is defined by the framework and cannot or only very 
expensively be altered within projects. 
• Changes in the framework may lead to expensive changes in the software: because 
the frameworks provides the software design and defines the control flow of the 
software, nearly all changes in the framework lead to updates within the software. 
Frameworks have become more common and important in today’s software industry 
because they significantly reduce time-to-market and cut down costs. 
2.4 Agent 
There are lots of different definitions what an agent is. Within this context we assume 
that an agent is a process that is able to autonomously initiate changes within its envi-
ronment and react to changes therein (see Tanenbaum (2003), pp. 202). This definition 
matches a lot of processes but contains the very important characteristics which distin-
guish agent-bases systems from “standard” software. These characteristics are summa-
rized in table 2-1. 
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Property Description 
Autonomous Can act independently, e.g. with no intervention of users 
Reactive Reacts in time to changes in its environment 
Proactive Initiates actions which are changing the agent’s envi-
ronment 
Communicative Can exchange information with other systems, including 
but not limited to users and other agents 
Tab. 2-1 Characteristics of an agent (see Tanenbaum (2003), pp. 203) 
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA, see FIPA (2003)), a non-profit 
organisation aimed at producing standards for the interoperation of heterogeneous soft-
ware agents, has released lots of specifications dealing with agent-based systems. A 
proposed architecture of a system for mobile agents can be found on their website (see 
FIPA (2002)). The FIPA specifications mostly deal with inter-agent communication. 
Today, most specifications deal with messaging-standards. Therefore, it is very difficult 
to implement all of the FIPA messaging standards, because they are very generic and 
powerful, although under most circumstances only subsets of the functionality is 
needed. 
All agents that want to be able to communicate with each other need to agree on a 
common language. A standard for such a language is the FIPA Agent Communication 
Language (ACL, see FIPA (2002a)) which specifies a standard language for inter-agent 
communication. 
To further describe the function of an agent there are subclasses like Collaborative 
Agents Interface-Agents, Information-Agents and Mobile Agents; the latter is the im-
portant one for the creation of this framework. 
The use of software agents is also propagated as a solution to common software engi-
neering problems (see Jennings (2000)). 
2.5 Mobile Code 
In classical client/server- and multi-tier- applications only data will be sent over the 
network. However it may be beneficial or necessary to transfer code and execute it on 
another computer. This process is called migration. Advantages of using mobile code 
are (see Tanenbaum (2003), p .186): 
• Migrate processes to systems which have unused resources available to distribute the 
load. 
• Execute code near the data or the input, which means that less data needs to be trans-
ferred over the network thus enhancing response times. 
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However sending and executing code on other machines raises some concerns: 
• The source of the code needs to be authenticated or executed in a secure environment 
so that no damages to local data and/or other resources may occur. 
• The migration possibly shall take place between different platforms which means 
further efforts have to be made to make the code portable. 
There are many possibilities for mobility. To further categorize mobility there are three 
possible characteristics of mobile code: 
• Weak vs. Strong Mobility: In a system which uses weak mobility only the code is 
transferred between two systems, possibly including initialization data. In contrast, 
strong mobility means that a process may be stopped at any time and then the code as 
well as the current state is transferred to another system, where the execution pro-
ceeds as if no break would have occurred. 
• Sender vs. Receiver initiated mobility: The type of mobility categorizes between who 
took action to initiate the code migration. Either the receiver requested code from a 
sender which is transferred and then executed, e.g. a Java™ applet, or the sender 
wants to migrate a piece of code to another machine like distributed search programs. 
• Execution in the same or a separate process: The receiving system has to decide 
whether the received mobile code has to be executed in the same process or whether 
a new process should be spawned. Utilizing the same process is easier to implement 
and conserves resources but the process has to take security measures. By creating a 
new process the operating system is responsible for security. For this reason a safe 
implementation might be easier. 
Mobile code can be an effective way of implementing applications. However the pro-
grammers need to take care of security. 
2.6 Mobile Agent 
A mobile agent is a special type of agent which is capable of travelling between differ-
ent computer systems. 
Mobile agents are implemented using mobile code. That means agents can migrate be-
tween different machines. By deploying mobile agents the agents’ requests can be is-
sued near the target and the responses do not need to travel across the whole network 
which can improve the response time. However, by utilising mobile code, mobile agents 
not only share the advantages but share the common problems as well which are espe-
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cially security and platform independency. A main task of this framework is to provide 
solutions to these problems. 
A mobile agent normally uses weak mobility that means it carries his state from device 
to device till his purpose has been fulfilled, but normally the current execution state, for 
example the stack, cannot be migrated. The migration is normally initiated by the sender 
as well, e.g. the agent itself (acting autonomously) or the system it runs on (for example 
before it is shutdown). 
2.7 Peer-to-Peer-Network 
The term peer-to-peer-network (p2p-network) has a wide range of definitions that are 
nearly identical but sometimes have very different emphasises. 
Common to all definitions is the fact that a p2p-network is a network of devices which 
are able to access resources on all other devices as well as providing resources to them. 
The main issue where most definitions significantly differ at is the question whether this 
network may have some central services like servers4 for special supporting purposes, 
especially name resolution, or not5. 
Examples for p2p-networks include ICQ (instant messaging & chat, see ICQ (2003)) 
and eDonkey (file sharing, see eDonkey (2003)) for p2p-networks with centralized 
lookup-services on the one hand and Windows Networking (file and print services, see 
WOWN (2003)) and Gnutella (file sharing, see Limewire (2003)) without centralized 
resources on the other hand. 
The different implementation of how to resolve names shows a real problem when de-
signing a p2p-network: Because nodes can join and leave and may rejoin with different 
IP addresses and consequently with different DNS names, a p2p-network needs to de-
sign and manage its own namespace. This resource centric addressing, like your chat 
nickname, is something which may be seen as one of the greatest changes and perhaps 
benefits when using p2p-networks (see Shirky (2000)). 
Within the last years p2p-technology has become generally known through the rise of 
file-sharing software. This software is generally used to swap copyrighted material and 
is therefore illegal. Therefore many people think that p2p-networks can only be used for 
copyright infringement, although there are many new developments like a distributed 
search engine DFN S2S (see DFN (2003)) designed by Germany’s National Research 
and Education Network (Deutsches Forschungsnetz, DFN). 
                                                 
4 see Fontana (2002) for an example 
5 see Foster (2003) for an example 
13 
3 OpenPGP-Transport Security 
3.1 Requirements for a security concept 
Communication over untrusted connections, like the Internet, need to be secured in or-
der to protect data and privacy. Normally, security is established by authenticating con-
nections and encrypting the data between them. However, in p2p-networks, in which 
anonymous users can log in as well as users can authenticate themselves, the problem 
becomes more difficult. The problem is even more complicated since each network host 
must assign access rights to mobile agents. 
A new security-model for distributing agents had to be developed, since the standards in 
use do not meet all of the following requirements for open and freely usable p2p-
networks: 
• if required, provide authentication for agents, agents’ owners and agents’ program-
mers in an open p2p-network, 
• if required, allow anonymous usage of the network, 
• do not use any central resource, 
• provide secrecy in terms of encryption for transmitted data, and 
• allow agents to have different security-settings on different hosts. 
The introduced security-concept, named OpenPGP-Transport Security, addresses all of 
these problems. But due to the nature of mobile agents and open networks, it is not pos-
sible to rule out all security problems, especially the malicious host problem, which has 
not been solved today (see Bierman (2002) and Marques (2002)). The OpenPGP-
Transport Security concept is based on the ideas initially outlined by LÜBKE and GOMÉZ 
(see Lübke (2004)). 
3.2 Introduction to Public-Key Cryptography 
For providing confidentiality of transmissions, data need to be encrypted and for au-
thenticating transmissions, data can be digitally signed. For this, public-key cryptogra-
phy will be used, since it allows the easy distribution of encryption keys without the 
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need of trusted and secure communication links, which are not available in open p2p-
networks. 
Public-key cryptography uses two keys per party, one called the public and the other the 
private key. The public- and private-key are generated in the same process. Theoreti-
cally, it is possible to calculate one key if the other is known. But in practice this prob-
lem is mathematically so difficult that it is impossible to do this calculation, because it 
would take millions of years on average (see Johnson (1999)) to do so. 
The interesting property of these keys is that they are complementary: Data encrypted 
with one can only be decrypted with the other and vice versa. 
This allows the distribution of the public-key over insecure channels to all entities with 
whom one wants to communicate. The public-key can then be used by the sending en-
tity to encrypt the data which is send afterwards to the receiver. Since the receiver is the 
only one who has the private-key, he is the only one who is able to decrypt the data. 
This process is illustrated in figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1: Public Key encryption process (ACCC (2000)) 
For signing data digitally, the sender first calculates the hash-value of the message and 
encrypts it with his private key. A hash-function is a function which calculates a small 
fixed-size value from a variable length input. In no way, it is possible to extract any 
information about the original message from the hash-value. Furthermore, the hash-
functions used in cryptology must guarantee, that it is as difficult as possible to calcu-
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late two messages with the same hash-value6 (see Hyperdictionary (2003)). The en-
crypted hash later is encrypted with the sender's secret and can be decrypted with the 
sender's public-key. At this point, the recipient of a transmission is able to compare the 
decrypted hash-value with the hash-value of the transmission. If they match, the digital 
signature is valid, if not, the data has been changed in transit7. 
Probably the most known algorithm for public-key encryption is RSA8 - named after its 
developers RONALD RIVEST, ADI SHAMIR, and LEONARD ADLEMAN. Hash-functions 
commonly used are MD59 (Message Digest Version 5) and SHA10 (Secure Hash Algo-
rithm). 
3.3 Public-Key Cryptography and Trust 
However, being able to encrypt something with a public-key does not solve the whole 
problem. One can exchange the public-keys over insecure media without putting the 
secret key at risk, but it can not be guaranteed, that someone replaces the originally 
transmitted key with his own key. Encrypting to the wrong key enables an attacker to 
read the sensitive data in transit. 
Therefore, one needs to trust a key before using it, so that traffic is not encrypted to an 
attacker, who is also called “man-in-the-middle”. To accomplish this, a validation proc-
ess has to be established which leads to a public-key infrastructure (PKI) where users 
and software can retrieve and validate keys. 
Many systems, which are designed for deploying mobile agents, like MARISM-A, util-
ize the X.509 certificate standard for storing and managing keys in the underlying pub-
lic-key infrastructure, which is defined in RFC 3280 (see Housley (2002)). 
X.509 depends on a centralized architecture, in which so called Certification Authorities 
(CA) issue certificates. The certificate is trusted, if the CA is trusted and the CA has 
issued the certificate containing the key. Examples for CAs are VeriSign11 or TC Trust-
                                                 
6 Because the target set of the hash-function iss maller than the set of the input values, there will always 
be duplicate hash-values. The question is, how difficult it is to find two inputs which give the same 
output. 
7 A more complete introduction is given by Davi Youd (Youd (2000)) 
8 The original version is (Rivest (1978)), an easier explanation is given under (DI Management (2003)) 
9 MD5 is defined in RFC 1321 (Rivest (1992)) 
10 SHA is defined in RFC 3174 (Eastlake (2001)) 
11 Corporate homepage is http://www.verisign.com 
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Center12. The CA may also sign another entity and allow it to sign other keys as well. 
This chain of CAs and the key is called a trust path or certification hierarchy. 
The public-key together with user information like name, e-mail etc., and the complete 
trust path, including the public-keys, are stored in this so called certificate. The certifi-
cate may also contain information about what a user is allowed to do. These may be 
technical, like acting as a CA, or from a economical point of view, like ordering goods 
for a company. However, the X.509 standard is very imprecise in this aspect, which has 
lead to differing and incompatible implementations how to handle these extensions. 
This and many other drawbacks of the standard are discussed in the X.509 Style Guide 
(see Gutman (2000)). 
The X.509 standard is widely used in industry for storing keys which are used for secur-
ing web transactions (Secure Socket Layer (SSL, see Erkomaa (1998)) and Transport 
Layer Security (TLS, RFC 2246 (Dierks (1999)) or for sending e-mails (S/MIME, RFC 
2633 (Ramsdell (1999)) and is tightly integrated in standard software like browsers and 
e-mail-software. However, the central approach has some drawbacks: 
• if the CA's private key is exposed, the whole security model collapses, 
• a key can only be signed by one CA, 
• only CAs can sign keys, 
• for each CA the certificate has to be installed locally, 
• therefore, the CA key has to be transferred securely to the local machine via a secure 
connection, and 
• implementations of peer-to-peer networks without any central resource are not possi-
ble. 
Because of these drawbacks, especially the last one, this framework defines a security 
concept without the use of the X.509 standard, which can be used for establishing a se-
curity model in agent-driven p2p-networks. 
                                                 
12 Corporate homepage is http://www.trustcenter.de 
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3.4 The OpenPGP Standard 
In 1991 PHIL ZIMMERMANN released the first version of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). It 
was developed to make the use of encryption easy and usable for private persons. It uses 
strong public-key encryption and digital signatures. Because of this and the legislation 
in the United States of America during that time, PGP faced lots of legal problems, be-
cause it was considered to be a weapon. All these issues are resolved today. PGP was 
further developed and the program changed ownership a lot. Since 2002 it is owned by 
PGP Corporation13. 
The original message format was slightly changed and was standardized as RFC 2440 
(see Callas (1998)) as OpenPGP in the year 1998. Today it is widely used in the aca-
demic and open source area to encrypt and sign e-mail traffic and software packages.  
The OpenPGP standard allows the use of many encryption and signing algorithms and 
allows the extension by any new algorithm. Commonly supported ones for encryption 
and digital signatures are: 
A key should uniquely be identified by its key fingerprint. The fingerprint is a hash 
value, consisting of 128 bit, which should be unique world-wide. 
However, for simplicity, when normally referencing keys, so called key-ids are used, 
which are the last 4 bytes of the key fingerprint. These are not unique world-wide (see 
Harris (2002)), but can used practically without causing too many headaches. 
Instead of relying on a hierarchical trust model, OpenPGP uses a decentralized approach 
which is called the “web of trust”. Its principle is very easy: Everyone can sign any key. 
By signing, one guarantees that the key really belongs to the one, whose name is saved 
with that key. This practice leads to a graph which represents the trust relationships be-
tween the keys and their persons. A real world example is illustrated in figure 3-2. 
                                                 
13 Corporate homepage is http://www.pgp.com 
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Figure 3-2: Example of a Web of Trust 
To validate a key, the user has to obtain a trustworthy chain between his key and the 
key he wants to use. This chain is called a path or trust-path. For making this task easy, 
there are so called pathfinders, like Jonathan McDowell’s (see McDowell (2002)). To 
establish these signatures, keys are signed between colleagues, friends and during so 
called key-signing parties. There are statistics available for the web of trust, as well as 
for individual keys. One very prominent example is maintained by HARRIS (Harris 
(2003)). 
The main problem with this approach is, that one often has to trust one or many chains 
between one's own key and another. The trust in a chain can be controlled via so called 
“owner-trust”, which describes to which degree one trusts signatures made by another 
key: If one thinks, the key's signatures are fully trustworthy, that means that a signature 
really does guarantee that the user carefully verified the key's ownership, one will as-
sign full owner-trust to that key. If one is not sure, also marginal trust or no trust can be 
assigned. 
This way, it is possible to establish CAs in the OpenPGP world as well. The standard 
proposes an ultimate owner trust, which normally is only assigned to one's own key. 
19 
This ultimate trust can also be assigned to other keys which in turn means, that this key 
is as trustworthy as one's own key. So by assigning ultimate owner trust to a key, that 
key becomes a de facto CA key. There are CAs for OpenPGP keys as well, like 
HeiseCA14, which can be treated as a CA but can also be treated as a key like any other, 
depending on the user's trust settings. 
However, it is not possible to inherit trust from a CA: With X.509 a CA may certify 
another CA. If one trusts the top-level CA, one will also trust certificates issued by the 
lower-level CA, which automatically is not possible in OpenPGP because the user has 
full control about the trust settings. 
The OpenPGP standard is widely implemented. The most important examples are PGP 
and the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, GNUPG (2003)). GnuPG is an open source de-
velopment, which was also funded by the German government and ported to a variety of 
platforms, like Windows, Linux, MacOS X, etc. Both implement the cryptographic al-
gorithms and the standard message format. PGP also allows integration into the most 
famous, commercially used e-mail clients, while GnuPG uses plug-ins, developed by 
third parties for integration. 
3.5 OpenPGP vs. X.509 
Although OpenPGP and X.509 deploy the same cryptographic algorithms and are there-
fore equally technically secure, both are using a completely different trust model. 
This leads to some differences: In the OpenPGP world the user has more control over 
his security settings. There is not necessarily a CA and keys can be verified by more 
than one person. In turn, the user has more responsibilities and but also full control of 
his communication. 
The CA in X.509 public-key infrastructures represents a single point of failure, but al-
lows easy key distribution, because on the clients no additional trust-settings have to be 
made. Failures might be technical, e.g. leak of the CA’s private key, or social, e.g. false 
certificates are issued. 
Another advantage of CAs is, that a certificate is either fully trusted or not trusted at all, 
depending whether the CA is trustworthy or not and the certificate is valid or not. In 
OpenPGP, keys can be marginally trusted because of the paths through which the keys 
                                                 
14 Project homepage is http://www.heise.de/security/dienste/pgp/ 
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are being validated. There might not always be a short path between two keys making 
the decision if a key is trustworthy or not very difficult. 
An advantage of the OpenPGP model is that the key-validation is not commercialized. 
CAs are normally getting paid for issuing certificates, but the key-signing process with 
OpenPGP is free. 
Furthermore, the approach of the web of trust is more suited to the world of p2p-
networks: No central resources are needed and the security infrastructure is as easily 
extensible as the network itself. Each user can choose his individual security settings in 
a way similar to how he chooses to share files today. Anonymous users can use the p2p-
network, as well, and users do not need to pay for official certificates. This allows more 
users to use the p2p-network, encouraging further usage and bringing more resource to 
the network. 
For both X.509 certificates and OpenPGP implementations are available, in commercial 
or free software, so that they can be easily be integrated into applications. Both systems 
have proved their strength in day to day applications and are the only remaining stan-
dards in cryptography, which are used in practice. 
3.6 OpenPGP and Mobile Agents 
The OpenPGP standard is well suited for use in p2p-networks. It allows a security 
model which is not dependent on central resources like CAs. Instead, users can choose 
and verify which keys and users are trustworthy. 
Furthermore, bringing the web of trust to the world of mobile agents, new applications 
are possible: applications in which agents can learn trust, p2p-networks of agents which 
are operating in an open manner etc. 
The question, which therefore needs to be resolved, is what parts need to be encrypted 
or signed and on which things security policies can work and decide which rights an 
agent has on the system or within a transaction. 
The proposed security architecture is based on two signatures for the agent and three 
keys: One signature for the code, which identifies the programmer of the agent. The 
next signature identifies the agent's owner. Furthermore, hosts have to encrypt and sign 
the agent's state when it is sent over the network. 
21 
The permissions an agent has within transactions, like on-line auctions, are stored 
within an agent passport, in which the owner can state which limits an agent has. 
Every participant in the p2p-network can have a key: a host, a user and an agent. The 
keys are correspondingly named host-key, user-key and agent-key. 
The host-keys and agent-keys are identified by a prefix in their description: “HOST:” 
and “AGENT:”, like “HOST: myhost”. It should be taken care that these two key types 
are never uploaded to the central key-servers. Instead their distribution should be part of 
the p2p-network, so that the central key servers are not polluted by keys belonging to 
virtual entities, which are not part of normal e-mail communication. The user-keys can 
be uploaded to the key-servers and can be used for normal e-mail traffic as well. 
3.7 Packaging-Format 
The OpenPGP-Transport format packages all agent-related information into a ZIP ar-
chive. The ZIP archive provides two main advantages: 
• The ZIP archive is compressed thus reducing the used network bandwidth for send-
ing agents, and 
• the ZIP archive can contain multiple files, so that all information can be stored into 
it, but only one file needs to be transferred. 
Inside the ZIP archive there are following items: 
• agent.jar: Contains the agent's code inside a Java™ archive (see Hyperdictionary 
(2003)). The Main-class property of the Java™ archive has to be set to a class im-
plementing the agent's logic. 
• owner.asc, programmer.asc, agent.asc: Contain the owner-key, programmer-key and 
agent-key in OpenPGP standard format. The files can be a binary representation of 
the keys, although ASCII-armoured representation is preferred. 
• ownercert.asc, programmercert.asc: Contain the verification of the owner and the 
programmer. 
• passport.txt: Contains the clear signed agent-passport as described below. 
• state.dat: Contains the serialized state of the agent. 
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To differentiate between hosts, there can be alternate versions of these files. They have 
to be named file.host.suf, like passport.myhost.txt. This indicates that the host myhost 
should use this agent-passport which is encrypted using the myhost's public host key.  
3.8 Keys 
OpenPGP keys are used to guarantee the safety in this security concept. There are three 
public-keys of interest for the security system, one for each assigned party to an agent: 
• Agent-Key 
The agent-key is the agent's own key. The corresponding key pair is generated before 
deploying the agent and is unique to this agent's instance. Using the secret key on the 
owner's peer, it is possible to sign data for the agent, which it can verify on selected 
or each target peer using its public-key. This way, it is possible to implement the 
itinerary protection scheme initially developed for the MARISM-A platform. 
The agent's key is stored inside the ZIP archive as agent.asc. 
• Owner-Key 
An agent does actions on behalf of its user without the user needing to oversee its ac-
tions. However, security settings may vary for agents of different users, like hiding 
personal data and opening them only for friends. Therefore, agent owner's must be 
reliably identified. This can be accomplished by signing the code and certifying the 
agent was sent by a specific user. Furthermore data can be encrypted to the owner 
only, thus guaranteeing that the accessed data are really only readable by him. 
The owner's key is stored inside the zip-file as owner.asc. 
• Programmer-Key 
Sometimes it can be useful to trust a programmer. For example if an anonymous 
agent visits a peer, it has no owner associated but rights have to be granted or not. If 
there are some standard types of agents they can be certified this way, allowing them 
to enter the system with appropriate security settings in effect. The use of the pro-
grammer-key is somewhat similar to the trust model of ActiveX (see Microsoft 
(2001)). However, the user can limit the agent after it is accepted by the system by 
using the Java™ security model instead relying completely on this certificate. 
The programmer-key is stored inside the ZIP-file as programmer.asc. 
Note, that all keys can be present for an agent, only some or even none. The peer has to 
choose the security-settings and must be aware of this. 
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3.9 Agent Passport 
The agent-passport, which is stored as passport.txt, is a clear-signed15 name/value-list, 
like in the following example: 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
AgentName=ExampleAgent 
Owner=NoOwner 
OwnerHost=SomeHost.domain.com 
Expires=1900-01-01 00:00 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- 
... 
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 
 
Values are simply stored as name-value pairs, where the name and the value are both 
case-sensitive, e.g. the attribute NAME is not equal to the attribute Name. The whole 
name-value list has to be signed by the owner's key. The signature has to be a clear-
signed OpenPGP signature. 
There are some standard-fields available, which should be supported by all passport 
implementations: 
• AgentName 
The AgentName directive specifies the name of the agent. This way, the name can be 
authenticated, because it is contained in the signed data block. 
• Owner 
The Owner directive can contain a clear-text name of the owner, which is only for 
reporting etc. 
• AgentKey 
This option specifies the agent's key. That way it is possible to verify, if the agent's 
key has been exchanged in the transmitted ZIP archive. If the ZIP archive does not 
contain an agent's key, the system will try to fetch the key otherwise. If this is not 
possible, the agent must not be accepted. 
• OwnerHost 
The OwnerHost option specifies from which peer the agent was started. This peer is 
considered the agent's home peer, to which the agent can request to go back. 
                                                 
15 A clear-signed signature combines the signed data and the signature into one document, in contrast to a 
detachted signature where the signature and the signed data are seperated into two files 
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• Expires 
A passport can expire at a given date, which has to be specified as YYYY-MM-
DD HH:mm, like 2004-01-31 00:00. After this date, the passport may not be used 
and the system should reject the agent completely. 
Note, that any name-value pairs can be put into the passport, so this approach is very 
extensible. For instance, PINs, passwords, further identification, e-cash etc. can be 
stored inside the agent's passport. 
3.10 Owner Verification 
The owner is being verified by an extra owner certificate, which can be transferred 
within the ZIP archive. It is not mandatory, so if one wants to send an agent anony-
mously, one can leave out the owner certificate. 
An example owner certificate looks like this: 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
OWNER_CERTIFICATE 
 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- 
... 
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 
 
It is a clear-signed plaintext-file whose first line must be OWNER_CERTIFICATE fol-
lowed by a blank line. After the blank line, the MD5 hash of the agent’s archive is 
saved. Since the owner certificate is signed by the owner, nobody can tamper with it. 
However, the owner certificate should only be used in conjunction with a valid agent 
passport and an agent-key, because otherwise the system is open to replay attacks, 
where an agent is send to the network which uses the same code but using other in-
stance data. Depending on the agent's implementation this can lead to security risks, so 
it is necessary to always verify the agent-passport as well and to make sure, that the 
owner certificate is signed by the same key as the passport is. 
3.11 Programmer Verification 
The programmer of an agent can be identified the same way as the owner. The certifi-
cates for the owner and the programmer are differing only in the first-line certificate 
identification string which is PROGRAMMER_CERTIFICATE for this type of certifi-
cate, as can be seen in the example: 
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
PROGRAMMER_CERTIFICATE 
 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- 
... 
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 
 
The programmer is the author of the agent code and need not be affiliated with the cur-
rent agent's owner. The use of the programmer verification process is the ability to al-
low code developed by trusted third parties to enter the system. For example, a user may 
decide to only trust a specific software company and may configure this p2p-client to 
reject all agents which are developed by others. 
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4 Development Process 
The framework has been developed a sequential process like the classical Waterfall 
Model (see Barkstrom (2000)). The Waterfall Model divides the development process 
into strictly separate phases which are conducted sequentially. Each phase is dependant 
on its predecessor so that it is basically a step-by-step approach spanning from the con-
ceptional idea to the final product. 
The conceptional idea has already been outlined in the introduction and was the task to 
solve. The second step consists of the requirements-specification. Since the require-
ments of the framework include all design requirements of the applications based on it, 
the next chapter will list the general design requirements, e.g. flexibility, as well as the 
application use-cases which have to be supported. These use-cases have been selected 
by looking at existing applications and frameworks and based on the initial p2p-
concept. 
The next step was to decompose the whole system into different functionality domains. 
These domains should be as independent from each other as possible and were sepa-
rated into packages. 
The design for each package was then developed, defining the interfaces and specifying 
their responsibility. During this step, the future control-flow became visible the first 
time. This lead to some changes in the packages - especially the introduction of the con-
tainer-package - to where more and more interfaces, related to the execution environ-
ment, were moved. 
Afterwards, the implementation of the supporting abstract classes and the basic imple-
mentation were done. This process was accompanied by small test-fragments, which 
were used to verify that the implementations were working as expected. However, dur-
ing this process, it became visible that the system was decomposed into packages, but 
that too many reference on runtime-objects existed, making the decoupling harder. For 
example, the OpenPGP-Transport implementation was dependent on the GnuPG cryp-
tographic routines. To resolve this, so called managers were introduced to decouple the 
system. This leads to some changes in the interfaces, which made them cleaner and re-
sulted in a very flexible and modular design. 
After completing the framework, the sample application was developed. The design of 
this application is described in chapter eight. The application was a proof-of-concept for 
the design. Although the design worked, the application showed some parts, where 
probably some functionality would be used by every application based on the frame-
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work. For this reason, some convenience routines were moved from the sample applica-
tion into the framework. 
The last step was to verify the javadoc documentation in the source-files, which had 
been inserted there right from the beginning but was extended at the end to make some 
parts more precise. 
The result is a framework, consisting of approximately 9100 lines of code (LOC), in-
cluding the javadoc documentation, which has proven in a sample-application that the 
design is good and usable. 
For developing the whole system and the sample application, following software was 
used: 
• Sun Microsystems™ JDK 1.4 
• Eclipse 2.1 
• ArgoUML/Poseidon Community Edition 
The choice of the JDK is obvious: It is the standard implementation of a Java™ VM 
produced by the inventor of the Java™ platform and should therefore guarantee compli-
ance to the Java™ standard. 
Eclipse, as shown in figure 4-1, is an open-source project16 initiated by IBM™ which 
aims to provide a framework for an integrated development environment (IDE). Every-
one is invited to supply plug-ins to Eclipse which are providing new functionality. The 
standard plug-ins provide a very good coding environment for Java™ including ad-
vanced refactoring methods for rearranging code fragments and changing designs on the 
fly. For this reasons, Eclipse was chosen for developing the framework since almost no 
graphical interfaces needed to be developed but much coding was to be done.  
                                                 
16 The project homepage is http://www.eclipse.org 
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Figure 4-1: Screenshot of the Eclipse IDE 
ArgoUML17 is an open-source design tool, producing UML diagrams. It has a commer-
cial counterpart Poseidon18, which is capable of producing more types of diagrams and 
can read ArgoUML’s files. Both were used for creating the UML diagrams to document 
the framework’s design. 
                                                 
17 The project homepage is http://argouml.tigris.org 
18 Tigris’, the manufacturer of Poseidon, homepage is http://www.gentleware.com 
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5 Framework Requirements 
For being successful and widely used in as many application types and applications as 
possible, the framework has to provide a basic set of functionality. These requirements 
can be associated with at least one category: basic functionality, security, flexibility, and 
ease of use. 
5.1 Basic Functionality 
The requirements will be outlined below including typical use cases which shall demon-
strate why and for which purpose features are introduced. The use cases can be sorted 
into one of the categories agent-related, migration-related, resource-related or agent-
subsystem-related. 
 
Figure 5-1: Agent-related use-cases 
Agent-related use-cases are use-cases which are dealing with agents’ actions and their 
life-cycle. These use-cases are illustrated in figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-2: Migration-related use-cases 
Migration-related uses-cases are dealing with the agents’ migrations, i.e. moving to 
other systems. These use-cases are shown in figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-3: Resource-related use-cases 
Resource-related use-cases are those which are dealing with the assignment and usage 
of resources. These are illustrated in figure 5-3. 
31 
 
Figure 5-4: Agent-subsystem related use-cases 
Finally, agent-subsystem related use-cases are those which are dealing with basic sys-
tem functionality and services. They are shown in figure 5-4. 
Within this chapter the functionality which will later be provided or supported by the 
framework will be called the “agent-subsystem” of the application which is also an ac-
tor for the use-cases. Later during the design phase this subsystem will be decomposed 
into different functionality domains. The use-cases are given in a tabular form described 
by Oestereich (Oestereich (2001)). 
This framework, like any other framework, is supposed to support a special kind of ap-
plication. It shall support applications relying on mobile agents in possibly unsafe peer-
to-peer networks. The framework will not only provide a design to the application de-
veloper but also a standard or basic implementation of often used functions and integral 
parts for the management of agents. 
However, it is also important to mention, which functionality will not be provided by 
the framework: The framework will only provide interfaces to peer-to-peer networks, 
but will not provide a peer-to-peer implementation of any kind. The reason for this is 
that there are many different and incompatible protocols available, so adding another 
one would make no sense. However, there are many implementations available, e.g. use 
the JXTA (see JXTA (2003)) framework developed by Sun Microsystems™ can be 
used. 
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5.1.1 Use Case: Agent-Subsystem start 
Actors: Application, agent-subsystem, new agent 
Pre-Conditions: - All providers are registered 
Post-Conditions: - Agent-subsystem is started 
- Agent-subsystem is connected to the peer-to-peer-network 
- Agents have been restored and are running again 
Tab. 5-1 Properties of the use-case “Agent-Subsystem start” 
This use-case, as outlined in table 5-1 describes the agent-subsystem start initiated by 
the application. Before, the application has to register all necessary functionality, like 
the peer-to-peer network implementation or the initial security policies. The agent-
subsystem will then connect to the network and initializes the basic security measures as 
well as internal structures to manage the agents. 
5.1.2 Use Case: Agent-Subsystem shutdown 
Actors: Application, agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent-subsystem is running 
Post-Conditions: - All agents' states are saved 
- All agents are stopped 
- Agent-subsystem disconnected from peer-to-peer network 
Tab. 5-2 Properties of the use-case “Agent-Subsystem shutdown” 
If the agent-subsystem is stopped by the application, it has to take care of the currently 
executed agents. It sends a message informing the agents of the shutdown so that these 
are able to relocate to other machines or kill themselves. 
If an agent does not want to do this, it is saved before the shutdown so it can be restored 
when the agent-subsystem is started again. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-2. 
If there were any agents running during the last shutdown these should be restored and 
restarted again. 
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5.1.3 Use Case: Administration 
Actors: Application, agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent-subsystem is running 
Post-Conditions: - Required action is performed 
Tab. 5-3 Properties of the use-case “Administration” 
Administrative instances like monitoring tools or administrators themselves should be 
able to kill an agent, stop or restart its execution and force the agent to move away from 
the current system. These functions are available in the agent-subsystem from the for-
mer use-cases but must be available and thus exported to the whole application utilizing 
this framework. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-3. 
5.1.4 Use Case: Logging 
Actors: Application,.agent-subsystem 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent-subsystem is running 
Post-Conditions: - Application is notified of the occurring of loggable events 
Tab. 5-4 Properties of the use-case “Logging” 
Logging is a very important function for complex systems: It makes debugging and 
monitoring systems possible and also a lot easier. Also, it is necessary for performance 
analysis. The agent-subsystem should provide logging functions to the application 
which contains the message passing in the system, agents' starts and stops and resource 
access. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-4. 
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5.1.5 Use Case: Agent Deployment 
Actors: Application, agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent-subsystem has been started 
Post-Conditions: - New agent has ID 
- Responsibility for new agent has been transferred to the agent-subsystem 
- New agent has security policy 
- New agent is running 
Tab. 5-5 Properties of the use-case “Agent Deployment” 
An agent deployment means that a new agent is created and deployed to the local node. 
The properties of this use case are described in table 5-5. The agent has to be created by 
the application and deployed to the agent-subsystem. It is necessary that the application 
does not only provide an object, but the code to this agent as well, because it needs to be 
transferred over the network. The subsystem will create a new identification for that 
agent which is returned to the application and will choose an appropriate security pol-
icy. The identification can be used to identify uniquely the agent within the whole net-
work. 
Furthermore responsibility for the agent will be transferred to the agent-subsystem 
which from then on will manage the agent and start it as soon as possible. 
5.1.6 Use Case: Agent Duplication 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent is running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is duplicated 
- New agent has security policy 
- New agent is running 
Tab. 5-6 Properties of the use-case “Agent Duplication” 
For some applications it is useful to duplicate an agent, for example if someone wants to 
traverse a network and wants to do this with more than only one agent. The properties 
of this use-case are described in table 5-6. 
The agent calls the agent-subsystem to duplicate it. The new agent will then be created 
and initialized by the agent-subsystem like any other new agent introduced by the appli-
cation. 
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The new agent will not have any resources registered. 
Note that it is only possible to duplicate an agent within one container. If the applica-
tion's need is to have this new agent to run at another node it has to ensure that the new 
agent will initiate a migration to the node afterwards. 
5.1.7 Use Case: Agent migration to any neighboured host 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is running on new node 
- Any resources are invalidated on the old host 
Tab. 5-7 Properties of the use-case “Agent migration to any neighboured host” 
The agent requests itself to be migrated to any other host. This might be useful before 
the actual node is shut down or the agent wants to search for resources randomly. 
The agent notifies the agent-subsystem that it wants to be transferred to a neighbouring 
host. The container will stop the agent, assemble the code and the current agent's state 
and orders the peer-to-peer network to transfer this package to any known hosts. The 
properties of this use-case are described in table 5-7. 
5.1.8 Use Case: Agent migration to a special host 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is running on new node 
- Any resources are invalidated 
Tab. 5-8 Properties of the use-case “Agent migration to a special host” 
The agent requests itself to be transferred to another, known host. This might be useful 
to travel to a special node known to provide useful resources. The properties of this use-
case are described in table 5-8. 
The agent notifies the agent-subsystem that it wants to be transferred to that host. The 
container will. stop the agent, assemble the code and the current agent's state. After-
wards it runs a search within the peer-to-peer network for the given host. If that host is 
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or becomes available it orders the peer-to-peer network to transfer the package contain-
ing the agent and its state to that host. 
5.1.9 Use Case: Agent migration along a special route 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is running on new node 
- Any resources are invalidated on the old host 
Tab. 5-9 Properties of the use-case “Agent migration along a special route” 
An agent wants to travel to a known node within the peer-to-peer network. This is use-
ful to gather resources known to be distributed along different machines. The properties 
of this use-case are described in table 5-9. 
The agent notifies the container that it wants to visit these nodes and the container will 
assemble a package as in the “agent migration to a special host” but will add routing 
information for the path. It then proceeds as if the agent is to be transferred to one other 
host only. 
If the current node is not the origin of the agent, it uses the saved path information to 
send the package to the next node in the path. 
5.1.10 Use Case: Agent migration to the predecessor 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is running on new node 
- Any resources are invalidated 
Tab. 5-10 Properties of the use-case “Agent migration to the predecessor” 
An agent wants to return to its owner travelling along the same path it used to travel to 
the current node. The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-10. 
The agent notifies the current execution environment which stops the agents like in the 
use-case “agent migration to a special host” where the special host is the system from 
where the agent was received. 
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5.1.11 Use Case: Agent migration to the owner 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is running on owner-node 
- Any resources are invalidated 
Tab. 5-11 Properties of the use-case “Agent migration to the owner” 
An agent wants to return immediately to its owner. It notifies the agent-subsystem 
where it is currently being executed which will extract the owner node of the agent from 
its meta-information and then will continue as in the use-case “agent migration to a spe-
cial host”. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-11. 
5.1.12 Use Case: Receiving an agent from the peer-to-peer network 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent-subsystem is connected to the peer-to-peer network 
Post-Conditions: - Agent's former node is saved 
- Agent has security policy 
- Agent is running on node 
Tab. 5-12 Properties of the use-case “Receiving an agent from the p2p-network” 
A request from a neighbouring node is processed by the peer-to-peer network system 
which transfers the request to the agent-subsystem. There the agent's code as well as an 
image of its internal state is unpacked and any further information, like routing informa-
tion is extracted and saved locally. Furthermore the agent-subsystem saves the node 
from which the agent came.  
The agent is then restored, including its state and the setup of the security settings which 
apply to it. The agent is now ready to be started in a new thread. Note that resources the 
agent wants to use need to be re-registered after the transfer. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-12. 
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5.1.13 Use Case: Return of an agent 
Actors: Application, Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent is running on owner node 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is stopped 
- Agent-reference is passed to the application 
Tab. 5-13 Properties of the use-case “Return of an agent” 
After gathering data an agent needs to deliver that data. If it has been migrated to its 
owner machine it can tell the agent-subsystem that it has completed its job. The agent-
subsystem will stop the agent and inform the application that this agent has successfully 
returned. The agent-subsystem will provide a reference to the stopped so that the appli-
cation can extract the gathered data. 
The properties of this use-case are outlined in table 5-13. 
5.1.14 Use Case: Register a resource 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent, resource 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Resource is allocated 
- Agent receives resource 
Tab. 5-14 Properties of the use-case “Register a resource” 
An agent normally needs supporting resources where it can use data from in order to 
accomplish its task. The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-14. 
Resources might be physically available like files and databases or pure virtual re-
sources like shared memory. 
Therefore, the agent can request a resource identified by the resource type, a colon and 
the resource's name, e.g. file:names.txt. If the resource is available, the agent-subsystem 
will add this resource to the agent's available resource-list. The agent is now free to use 
this resource. 
Note that other systems abstract all resources as agents and allow the resources to be 
controlled via the grant of message-passing-rights as in the use-case “agent communica-
tion”. However, local resources are treated differently in this framework, because: 
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• File access and other operations are normally performed synchronously in applica-
tions because they are easier to handle than asynchronous requests which are sending 
several messages to the calling agent. These messages need to be processed in other 
event handlers, thus destroying the control flow of the methods. Note that message 
passing to another agent in this framework always is an asynchronous operation be-
cause the other agent is executed in a different thread. 
• In general, message passing is possible between agents running on two different 
nodes within the network. However, for efficiency and security the use of resources 
should be limited to the local machine. 
• Message passing instead of directly accessing a resource adds overhead and a corre-
sponding, unnecessary penalty in execution speed. 
5.1.15 Use Case: Browse available resources 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent receives virtual resource containing all available resources 
Tab. 5-15 Properties of the use-case “Browse available resources” 
An agent might not be able to know what resources are available on the current system 
so it is necessary that the agent can obtain a list with all resources. This list is always a 
resource which exists on every node called “resources:”. If the resource's type is known 
an agent might obtain a list from “resources:file” which will only list all files available. 
The resource-list is a normal but pure virtual resource which contains a list of valid re-
source-names the agent can register and handle like any other resource. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-15. 
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5.1.16 Use Case: Unregister resources 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
- Agent has registered at least one resource 
Post-Conditions: - Resource is invalidated 
Tab. 5-16 Properties of the use-case “Unregister resources” 
After reading and perhaps writing data to resources, the agent can unregister itself from 
the resource, saving resources of the host system. This should always be done even 
though the agent-subsystem takes care of the unregistering when the agent is not exe-
cuted anymore on the system. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-16. 
5.1.17 Use Case: Agent communication 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent, message 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent running 
Post-Conditions: - Message is sent to its destination 
Tab. 5-17 Properties of the use-case “Agent communication” 
Agents are parts of software which can collaborate, so a mechanism is required which 
allows the communication from agent to agent. Furthermore it might be useful that the 
whole application might send messages to a specific agent, like commands received 
from the user interface. The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-13. 
These messages contain the sender, the receiver and the message body, containing 
commands and/or data. The sender will pass the message to the agent-subsystem which 
will forward the message either to a local agent or send the message over the peer-to-
peer network to another node. 
The commands may be encoded depending on the application's needs, however there is 
a standard called Agent Control Language (ACL) for which implementations do exist so 
that it should be a practical choice. 
If the agent wants to send a message to the local part of the application it can use the 
reserved name “host” as the message's destination. 
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The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-17. 
5.1.18 Use Case: Agent death 
Actors: Agent-subsystem, agent 
Pre-Conditions: - Agent is running 
Post-Conditions: - Agent is killed 
- All resources all invalidated 
Tab. 5-18 Properties of the use-case “Agent death” 
If the agent realized it has failed or it has accomplished a job without needing to deliver 
data it can destroy itself by telling the agent-subsystem to kill it which will stop the 
agent, unregister all resources and delete all information associated with the agent. 
The properties of this use-case are described in table 5-18. 
5.2 Security 
Mobile agents raise lots of security issues because they are implemented using mobile 
code which is normally untrusted, especially if it is in an anonymous peer-to-peer net-
work. 
To allow the safe execution the framework has to provide a rich set of security meas-
ures, like asymmetric encryption and signing19 of code and data. Furthermore the 
framework should limit the actions an agent may execute, e.g. do not make all files ac-
cessible. 
Agents should be anonymous, that means the owner is unknown, or should prove the 
owner with a passport. This passport is a ticket with the agent's name, its maximum life-
time and a signature of the owner as described in the OpenPGP Transport Standard. 
The agent's code can be signed by the programmer as well, so that the agent's developer 
is identifiable. 
The framework should provide so called security policies which can be associated with 
an agent and control the rights it has on the current node. The security policy can con-
trol whether an agent may access resources, write to them, pass messages etc. Whenever 
                                                 
19 Asymetric encryption and digital signatures are described in the chapter OpenPGP Transport Security  
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an agent is executed on the system a matching security policy has to be selected within 
the framework. This selection can be based on the developer, the owner and the name. 
For securing data in transfer, encryption and signing of the agent and its state is neces-
sary. To secure a path an agent wants to travel, an easy way is outlined in “Securing 
Your Data in Agent-Based P2P Systems” (Pang (2003)). 
During the development of the framework security especially means that input has to be 
validated before it can be trusted and no references to generic objects like Sys-
tem.Object in Java™ may be passed to agents. The latter ensures that no resources 
bound to an agent are transferred to another. 
The same problem exists, if an object with a specific interface is passed to an agent, but 
the object has more publicly accessible methods. It should be guaranteed that the passed 
object only provides public methods specified in this interface. If this is not the case, 
proxy classes20 have to be used. This is necessary because the agent is able to cast the 
object to its full interface and then accesses the “hidden” methods as shown in follow-
ing example: 
class MyImpl implements MyInterface 
{ 
  public void methodNotInInterface() { ... } 
} 
 
class MyAgent extends Agent 
{ 
  public void aMethod(MyInterface object) 
  { 
  MyImpl i = (MyImpl)object; // cast here 
  i.methodNotInInterface(); // should not be possible! 
  } 
} 
5.3 Flexibility 
To be useful for as many application scenarios as possible, the framework should be 
very flexible in terms of customization. It should be possible to exchange algorithms or 
plug in new functionality. This should apply to user interfaces, security policies, mes-
sage standards and peer-to-peer network implementations. However, this requirement 
does conflict with the framework's requirement of ease of use, because the more mod-
ules are exchangeable, the more methods are required for the registration process. 
                                                 
20 For a description of the Proxy design pattern see Gamma (2001), pp207ff. 
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6 Framework Overview 
6.1 General 
The framework is implemented in Java™21, a programming language and platform de-
veloped by Sun Microsystems™. Java™ has been chosen because of the benefits it of-
fers in the given application domain: 
• Portability 
Java™ programs run on top of a so called Java™ virtual machine, which creates a 
virtual platform. Programs are stored in Java™ byte-code which is transformed to 
platform specific machine code during runtime. This way a Java™ program can run 
on any computer, which has a Java™ virtual machine installed. Sun Microsystems™ 
offers Java™ virtual machines in the Java™ runtime environment (JRE) for several 
platforms free of charge, including Linux™, Windows™ and Solaris™. Other com-
panies, like IBM™ are offering a JRE as well for their systems. 
• Security 
Java™ has integrated security concepts since its first version: This way it is possible 
to ensure that certain code may not access local files etc. This technique has been 
used for Java™ Applets22, small programs which are embedded into web pages and 
executed within the browser but may not access any local resource and only establish 
connections to server, from which they are loaded. The restriction of Java™ Applets 
is also called sandboxing and can be applied to any code, including mobile agents. 
Furthermore, Java™ only uses object references and has no pointers, making direct 
memory access impossible. This way, buffer overflows, where bugs in applications 
are used to inject code, are impossible. The same is valid for the problem of dangling 
pointers: A reference always points to a valid object or has the value null. So it is not 
possible to access already deleted objects. 
• Productivity 
The use of references instead of pointers not only supports the security of an applica-
tion, but also enhances the programmer's productivity because programmers cannot 
directly access memory and therefore make fewer mistakes. Furthermore, the de-
struction of objects is handled by the JVM: A garbage-collector process is running in 
the background and freeing objects which are not referenced anymore, which im-
proves the development time and reduces the number of bugs. 
                                                 
21 Further information about Java™ can be found under http://java.sun.com 
22 Further information about Java™ applets can be found unter http://java.sun.com/applets/ 
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• Tools 
Not only the Java™ language itself is very convenient, but there are also many com-
fortable development environments available, like NetBeans by Sun Microsystems™ 
(Sun Microsystems (2003b), Eclipse initiated by IBM™ (Eclipse (2003)) and 
JBuilder by Borland (Borland (2003)). These tools are designed for supporting large 
projects integrating refactoring facilities, project management and further functional-
ity, like Unified Modelling Language23 (UML) support. 
For developing the framework, Eclipse has been used, because it has a very good editor 
and refactoring support for editing class structures during the whole developing process. 
6.2 Package structure 
 
Figure 6-1: Package structure of the framework 
The framework is decomposed into seven essential packages and one example package, 
in which all example code is placed. The hierarchy is illustrated in 6-1. The root pack-
age is, conforming to Sun Microsystems’™ standard (see Sun Microsystems (1999)): 
 de.tuclausthal.informatik.winf.mobileagents 
Because this name is very long, all names are abbreviated as following: 
.agent.Agent is de.tuclausthal.informatik.winf.mobileagents.agent.Agent. 
The seven essential sub-packages each represent one functionality domain of p2p-
applications based on mobile agents. The packages mostly contains interfaces which 
                                                 
23 For an introduction to UML see Oesterreich (2001) 
45 
have to be implemented by the application.. The package structure should also be used 
for own developments, that means, that if an agent is implemented, which means you 
are building a class which implements the interface .agent.Agent, it should placed in 
a package yourapp.agent. The seven sub-packages, containing the design for their 
specific functionality domain, are structured as following: 
• .agent 
This package contains all interfaces and abstract classes needed to implement an 
agent, especially the interface Agent which has to be implemented by all agents. 
• .container 
This package contains all interfaces which are needed for an own container-
implementation. A Container represents the execution environment for the mobile 
agents, which has to manage agents, their messages and resources. 
• .messaging 
The messaging-package contains all interfaces and abstract classes needed for pro-
viding messaging services and message management. 
• .p2p 
The p2p-package primarily contains the P2PNetwork interface, which provides the 
methods for accessing a p2p-network. Use this package to directly access a p2p-
network or, more importantly to implement a p2p-network protocol. 
• .packaging 
This package contains the interfaces needed for packaging an agent, that means stor-
ing and restoring it so that it can be transferred over the network and be resume exe-
cution on the other node. 
• .resource 
The resource-package contains the interfaces for dealing with the resources and their 
management. This framework deploys its own abstraction layer for accessing all kind 
of resources, which are accessible by the agents, like files, databases etc. The re-
source-management interfaces and the interface Resource are located in this pack-
age. 
• .security 
This package contains interfaces for the use of cryptographic code in this framework. 
Furthermore, the permission-handling encapsulated in the interface SecurityPolicy 
is included here. Besides the .container package, this is the place, where the sensi-
tive code is located and consistently should be tested thoroughly. 
46 
It should not be neccessary to instantiate a class out of any package directly; instead 
there are managers available, which are singletons and managing their corresponding 
object spaces. All requests for objects should be directed to these managers to make full 
use of the loose coupling of the framework for better maintenance and maintainability. 
Under most sub-packages there exists a further package impl. In these packages the 
basic implementations are located, like BasicContainer, which will be registered as 
default in the managers. Note, that there is no default implementation of a p2p-network 
because it is out of scope of this framework to provide a fully-fledged network and 
many p2p-networking protocols have been developed elsewhere. If an implementation 
is needed to experiment with, one can use the p2p-network from the sample application. 
6.3 Packages 
6.3.1 Package de.tuclausthal.informatik.winf.mobileagents 
ContainerManager
#instance:ContainerManager= null
<< create >>#ContainerManager
+getInstance():ContainerManager
+getContainer
#initialize():void
CryptographicManager
-providers:HashMap= null
#instance:CryptographicManager= null
<< create >>#CryptographicManager
+getInstance():CryptographicManager
+getProvider(provider:String):
+getProvider
+setCryptographicProvider():void
MessagingManager
-instance:MessagingManager= new MessagingManager()
-messagingProviders:HashMap= new HashMap()
<< create >>#MessagingManager
+getInstance():MessagingManager
+getMessagingProvider(proto:String):
+registerMessagingProvider():void
+dispatchMessage():void
+createMessage
P2PManager
#instance:P2PManager= null
-networks:Vector= null
<< create >>#P2PManager
+getInstance():P2PManager
+registerP2PNetwork():void
+getP2PNetworkCount():int
+getP2PNetwork(index:int):
+connect():void
+disconnect():void
+getNode(node:String):
PackagingManager
#instance:PackagingManager= null
-packagers:HashMap= null
-passportReaders:HashMap= null
<< create >>#PackagingManager
+getInstance():PackagingManager
+getPackager(packager:String):
+registerPackager():void
+getPassportReader(name:String):
+registerPassportReader():void
ResourceManager
#instance:ResourceManager= null
-resourceProviders:Vector= null
<< create >>#ResourceManager
+getInstance():ResourceManager
+getResourceProvider(protocol:String):
+createResource(resource:String,writable:boolean):
+getResourceProvider
+registerResourceProvider():void
SecurityPolicyManager
#instance:SecurityPolicyManager= null
<< create >>#SecurityPolicyManager
+getInstance():SecurityPolicyManager
+assignSecurityPolicy():void
ServiceManager
-instance:ServiceManager= null
-services:HashMap= new HashMap()
<< create >>-ServiceManager
+getInstance():ServiceManager
+registerService():void
+getService(name:String):  
Figure 6-2: Class diagram of the managers in the framework 
The base package of the framework contains so called manager-classes, as can be seen 
in figure 6-2. Managers are responsible for managing the functionality of a specific ap-
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plication domain. All managers are implemented using the Singleton design pattern24. 
This pattern is used to guarantee that only one object of a specific class is instantiated 
ever during the lifetime of an application. To achieve this, the constructor for the class 
is declared private or protected, so that it cannot be accessed outside of objects belong-
ing to the class. This results in a class which cannot be instantiated by any object be-
longing to another class in the application. However, to use the functionality provided 
by the singleton class, it has to be instantiated. For this, a static method, typically called 
getInstance is used which accesses a private or protected attribute, typically called 
instance. On the first call to getInstance the first and only object of the singleton is 
created and saved to the static member instance so that it can be accessed again. For 
example the ContainerManager is implemented this way: 
public class ContainerManager 
{ 
 [...] 
 protected static ContainerManager instance = null; 
 [...] 
 public static ContainerManager getInstance() 
 { 
  if(instance==null) 
  { 
   instance = new ContainerManager(); 
  } 
 
  return instance; 
 } 
} 
The advantage of using managers is the very high degree of independence between the 
subsystems of the framework: Since all calls for acquiring specific instances of classes 
are directed to the corresponding managers, these are responsible for returning the right 
or currently to-use implementation. Because all return values are only references to in-
terfaces and not to specific implementations, it is possible to change certain implemen-
tations without needing to update any other part of the application. For example, to get a 
CryptographicProvider object supporting the OpenPGP encryption standard, any 
application part has to call 
CryptographicProvider cp = CryptographicManager. 
getInstance().getCryptographicProvider(“OpenPGP”); 
The returned implementation can be whatever the current system uses, for example an 
implementation using GnuPG (like the default provider does) or a front end to PGP or 
some self-made implementation. This way the whole system is loosely coupled and very 
flexible. 
                                                 
24 For more information about the Singleton design pattern see see Gamma (2001), pp. 127ff. 
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Following managers are defined by the framework: 
• ContainerManager 
The ContainerManager is responsible for returning and managing the reference to 
the Container in charge. It is simply a singleton wrapper for the Container inter-
face, allowing the central access to the Container in use by using the getContainer 
method. 
• CryptographicManager 
The CryptographicManager is responsible for taking care of all Crypto-
graphicProvider in the application. Each CryptographicProvider, which offers 
cryptographic algorithms to the application, has to be registered with this manager 
using the registerCryptographicManager method. Afterwards all parts of the ap-
plication may obtain a certain CryptographicProvider object by calling the get-
CryptographicProvider method. 
• MessagingManager 
The MessagingManager is responsible for managing all of the MessagingProvider 
in use by the application. A MessagingProvider implements a certain protocol or 
virtual transport path for sending messages. Furthermore, the MessagingManager 
routes messages between these providers and thus is responsible for the message-
sending and -routing. The third function fulfilled by the MessagingManager is its use 
as a factory for the Message objects in use by this application, which are used to rep-
resent and validate messages in the application. 
• P2PManager 
The P2PManager is responsible for managing all p2p-networking-protocols in use by 
the application. Each protocol has to be registered via the method regis-
terP2PNetwork. The P2PManager is responsible for managing these and can be que-
ried for specific protocols via its method getP2PNetwork. The P2PManager therefore 
is the central access point for everything p2p-related. 
• PackagingManager 
The PackagingManager is responsible for managing all instances of the interface 
PackagingProvider, which can be used to transform Agent objects into a binary 
representation suitable for sending it over the network. If some part of the application 
needs this kind of functionality it has to acquire the corresponding provider via these 
managers. 
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• ResourceManager 
The ResourceManager is used to manage the resource-providers of the system. A 
ResourceProvider offers local physical and virtual resources to the agents. If an 
agent requests an Resource object the request has to be routed to the ResourceMan-
ager, which will find the corresponding ResourceProvider. The Resource-
Provider will then create a Resource object which can be used for reading and writ-
ing data. 
• SecurityPolicyManager 
The SecurityPolicyManager is responsible for assigning a SecurityPolicy to an 
Agent object. All incoming agents need to have a policy assigned, which will define 
their access rights on the local system. For example, every Packager, which recon-
structs a transmitted agent, has to use the SecurityPolicyManager to let a policy be 
assigned to the agent. 
• ServiceManager 
Services are extensions of the system which allow agents the use of further opera-
tions and access to the system, which are not predefined in the framework. These 
services have to be registered with the ServiceManager so they are accessible for 
the system and can be requested on the agents' behalf. 
The managers are integral to the framework: They define the control flow and are used 
frequently to obtain implementations of specific functionality domains. This way they 
shield the different subsystems from each other and allow easy interchangability of im-
plementations. 
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6.3.2 Package .agent 
Agent
(from de::tuclausthal::informatik::winf::mobileagents::agent)
+getName():String
+start():void
+stop():void
AgentBase
(from de::tuclausthal::informatik::winf::mobileagents::agent)
-name:String= null
-shouldStop:boolean= false
<< create >>+AgentBase
<< create >>+AgentBase(name:String):
+getName():String
+setName(name:String):void
+start():void
+stop():void
#shouldAgentStop():boolean
<< realize >>
 
Figure 6-3: Class diagram of the package agent 
The sub-package agent, as illustrated in figure 6-3, contains the interface Agent and 
an abstract base class AgentBase. An agent has to implement the interface Agent. Its 
main logic is placed inside the method start. This method is called whenever an 
agent should start execution. The method takes a reference to an AgentServices ob-
ject, which the agent must use in order to access resources and functionality of the host 
system.  
An agent is notified by the container that it should exit its start-method with a call to 
the method terminate. If the agent does not exit afterwards the system is allowed to 
kill the agent's thread. 
The interface Agent extends the Serializable interface, which can be used for trans-
forming an object into a byte-stream. The implementation is done transparently by the 
compiler, reducing implementation time. 
The abstract base class AgentBase provides a rudimentary implementation of all meth-
ods except the logic which has to be implemented in a derived class in the start-
method. 
A simple agent, as included as EchoAgent in the examples, may look like this (most 
comments have been stripped out for clarity and conciseness): 
public class EchoAgent extends AgentBase 
{ 
 public void start(AgentServices agentServices) 
 { 
  while(!this.shouldAgentStop()) 
  { 
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   // wait for a message 
   // method clears message so we don't need to delete it 
   Message m = agentServices.waitForNextMessage(); 
 
   // m can be null, e.g. if we should quit 
   if(m == null) continue; 
 
   if(m.getBody().equals("EXIT")) 
   { 
    return; 
   } else 
   { 
    // create a new message, agentServices work as a fac-
tory for us 
    Message echo = agentServices.createMessage(); 
    // set the recipient and the body 
    echo.setRecipient(m.getRecipient()); 
    echo.setBody(m.getBody()); 
    // we do not want a receipt 
    echo.setRequiresReceipt(false); 
    // send message 
    agentServices.sendMessage(echo); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
This example demonstrates how easy it is to implement an agent. The only thing one 
should pay close attention to is the termination of the main-loop, so that the agent exits 
safely and predictably. Any pending messages and open resources will be closed and 
deleted by the execution environment. If an agent should stop execution can be queried 
by using the method shouldAgentStop. This method is provided by the AgentBase 
abstract class for convenience. If an agent is written from scratch using the Agent inter-
face, the programmer has to check, whether the agent's thread has been interrupted by 
using the method Thread.isInterrupted or if the agent's stop-method has been 
called. 
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6.3.3 Package .container 
AgentCleaner
+cleanUp():void
AgentInfo
+getAgent():Agent
+getAgentName():String
+getAgentPassport
+getAgentPublicKey
+getAgentState():int
+getMessageList
+getOwnerPublicKey
+getOwnername():String
+getPackager
+getProgrammerName():String
+getProperty(name:String):Object
+getResourceList
+getSecurityPolicy
+setAgent(agent:Agent):void
+setAgentName(agentName:String):void
+setAgentPassport():void
+setAgentPublicKey():void
+setOwnerPublicKey():void
+setOwnername(ownerName:String):void
+setPackager():void
+setProgrammerName(programmerName:String):void
+setProperty(name:String,value:Object):void
+setSecurityPolicy():void
+getAgentServices
+addAgentCleaner(cleaner:AgentCleaner):void
+destroy():void
+getNodeReceivedFrom
+setNodeReceivedFrom():void
AgentServices
+createMessage
+sendMessage():void
+getMessageList
+waitForNextMessage
+requestResouce(resource:String,write:boolean):
+closeResource():void
+migrateToNode(node:String):boolean
+cryptToOwner(data:byte[]):byte[]
+verifyData(data:byte[]):boolean
+getPassport
+getNodeName():String
+getNeighborNodes():String[]
+getAgents():String[]
+getService(servicename:String):
Container
+loadAgent(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
+runAgent(agent:AgentInfo):void
+start():void
+shutdown():void
+forceAgentMigration(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
+killAgent(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
+createAgentInfo():AgentInfo
+setHostKey(hostKey:Key):void
+addContainerListener():void
+removeContainerListener():void
+canAcceptFurtherAgent():boolean
+getAgentCount():int
+setNodeName(nodeName:String):void
+addContainerMessageHandler():void
+removeContainerMessageHandler():void
+getNodeName():String
+getAgentInfos():AgentInfo[]
+dispatchMessage():void
+stopAgent(agent:AgentInfo):void
ContainerListener
+agentStateChanged(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
+agentLoaded(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
+agentKilled(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
+messageSent():void
+agentDied(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
ContainerMessageHandler
+messageReceived():void
Service
+getName():String
+setAgentInfo(agentInfo:AgentInfo):void
 
Figure 6-4: Class diagram of the package container 
The .container-package, as shown in figure 6-4, contains the interfaces for building 
so called Containers, which are execution environments for the agents. Their task is to 
manage all agents and their related resources. Furthermore, a Container object is re-
sponsible for serving the agents' requests, like message passing. After all, agents' re-
quests are submitted to an interface AgentServices which has to be implemented as 
part of the container-implementation. The AgentServices provide the agent with all 
the options it has. These include 
• message passing, 
• migration to other hosts, 
• obtaining neighbouring nodes in the network and 
• cryptographic services. 
If a platform wants to provide more services, it has to do so by implementing the func-
tionality into a class which implements the Service interface. Each Service can then 
be registered with the ServiceManager and acquired by an agent over its AgentSer-
vices instance. 
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For security reasons the AgentServices should only be implemented in an extra class 
and not as a part of the main container, so that type-casting attacks are not possible. For 
this reason, the methods are strictly separated into two interfaces. 
There exists an interface AgentInfo for managing agents. A Container should manage 
all agents through objects implementing this interface and store the appropriate proper-
ties therein. For most things there are standard accessor methods (getX and setX) avail-
able. For non-standard information, the AgentInfo provides a getProperty and set-
Property-method, which can retrieve and store named objects. Note that other parts of 
the application will likely access the AgentInfo, for instance a Packager object, which 
is responsible for transforming the Agent from a network byte-stream into an executa-
ble form, and will store further management-information to the AgentInfo. However, it 
is up to the Container how the AgentInfo should work. For example, it is possible to 
map an AgentInfo to another internal managing object, making it a proxy. Because of 
this, the container acts as a factory for its AgentInfo object: it has a method cre-
ateAgentInfo which returns an AgentInfo. This can be picked up and filled with in-
formation by a Packager. 
A Container object can be observed by a corresponding ContainerListener as speci-
fied in the observer pattern25. 
Events triggered to a ContainerListener are: 
• agents are created or killed, 
• agents states are changing, and 
• messages are sent. 
To subscribe to events the registerContainerListener-method has been invoked. 
This registers the given object so that it will be notified of further events by calls to the 
methods defined in the listener's interface. The complete process is illustrated in figure 
6-5. 
                                                 
25 For more information about the Observer design pattern see Gamma (2001), pp. 293ff. 
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:ContainerListener :Container
: addContainerListener()
 : agentDied(x)
: removeContainerListener()
 
Figure 6-5: Sequence diagram for the ContainerListener interface 
Furthermore, messages sent to the Container, e.g. the system itself, can be intercepted 
by objects adhering to the ContainerMessageHandler interface. This way, it is possi-
ble for remote agents to send messages to their home system or to log specific message 
traffic. 
6.3.4 Package .messaging 
Message
+getMessageID():String
+getSender():String
+setSender(sender:String):void
+getBody():byte[]
+setBody(body:String):boolean
+setBody(body:byte[]):boolean
+getRequiresReceipt():boolean
+setRequiresReceipt(require:boolean):void
+getDateSent():Date
+getRecipient():String
+setRecipient(recipient:String):void
+createNew():Message
MessageList
+addMessage(m:Message):void
+hasMessage():boolean
+getSize():int
+getMessage(i:int):Message
+getFirstMessage():Message
+getLastMessage():Message
+popFirstMessage():Message
+popLastMessage():Message
+popMessage(i:int):Message
+removeMessage(m:Message):void
+removeMessage(i:int):void
MessagingProvider
+getProtocol():String
+sendMessage(m:Message):void
 
Figure 6-6: Class diagram of the package messaging 
The .messaging-package contains the interfaces which are necessary to implement 
message-passing over the p2p-network as well as between local agents. The interfaces 
are illustrated in figure 6-6. The central interface is Message, which defines all attrib-
utes of a Message, which can be passed from one entity, like agent, peers etc., to an-
other. Essentially a message is a byte-array – a so called body - which should be sent to 
a recipient and has a sender. For convenience, a String may be set as the body which is 
transformed to a byte-array. 
The sender may require a receipt, which means that if the message is delivered, a con-
firmation is sent to the sender. 
Recipients and senders are identified by their corresponding address. An address is de-
fined as 
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protocol:entity[@peer] 
and consists of three parts: 
• the protocol, which identifies which protocol the system has to choose to deliver the 
message. For the peer, on which the message is send, simply use the local:-protocol, 
• the entity, which can be an agent, a host or another virtual identity. An entity's name 
may contain all alphanumerical characters and the underscore (A-Z, a-z, 0-9 and _), 
and 
• the destination peer, which is optional and appended with an @-sign at the entity-
name. The peer describes to which peer within the network, the message should be 
routed to. The peer-name has to adhere to the rules which are valid for the specified 
protocol and has to be reachable by that protocol as well. 
There is one special address defined in this framework, which is local:host. All mes-
sages sent to this address should be forwarded to the Container object in-use, which in 
turn will notify all its ContainerMessageHandlers. Additionally, all messages send via 
the local:-protocol are never allowed to leave the local node. 
If the application wishes to change the address structure, it has to reimplement the cor-
responding MessagingManager, because there the parsing of addresses and the corre-
sponding routing is done. 
6.3.5 Package .p2p 
Node
+getP2PNetwork
+getNodeName():String
+isOnline():boolean
+hasService(service:String):boolean
P2PAdapter
+connected():void
+disconnected():void
+messageReceived(from:Node,message:byte[]):void
P2PListener
+connected():void
+disconnected():void
+messageReceived(from:Node,message:byte[]):void
+agentReceived(from:Node,message:byte[]):void
P2PNetwork
+getNeighborNodes():Node[]
+searchForService(service:String):Node[]
+getNode(name:String):Node
+sendAgent(toNode:Node,agent:AgentInfo):boolean
+connect():void
+disconnect():void
+isOnline():boolean
+registerP2PListener(listener:P2PListener):void
+removeP2PListener(listener:P2PListener):void
+getLocalNodeName():String
P2PNetworkBase
-listeners:Vector= new Vector()
+registerP2PListener(listener:P2PListener):void
+removeP2PListener(listener:P2PListener):void
#notifyConnected():void
#notifyDisonnected():void
#notifyMessageReceived(from:Node,message:byte[]):void
<< realize >>
<< realize >>
 
Figure 6-7: Class diagram of the package p2p 
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The purpose of the .p2p-package, as shown in figure 6-7, is to provide the interfaces for 
the peer-to-peer network component of the application. It mainly consists of the inter-
face P2PNetwork and a corresponding listener interface. The listener may be used to 
monitor the network, e.g. when connections go up or down. 
Note that this package does not enforce a specific p2p-network design: The network can 
be designed as one likes. This includes the internal classes for the implementation as 
well. Only the external interface has to match the interface P2PNetwork. For this reason, 
the P2PNetwork interface concentrates only of the framework's requirements, for in-
stance, sending a message object or migrating an agent. 
The p2p-network's nodes have to be accessible via the Node interface. Normally there 
will be a wrapper-class implementing this interface and encapsulating the official p2p-
network address of a node and delegates all non-trivial method-calls to the P2PNetwork 
implementation. This way, the p2p-network implementation can determine the right 
return values and answer them accordingly. Furthermore, the Node implementation will 
be light-weight and possibly can be implemented as an inner class without degrading 
code readability. 
6.3.6 Package .packaging 
AgentPassport
+getCertificationKey
+getValue(name:String):String
+getDate(name:String):Date
AgentPassportReader
+parseAgentPassport(data:byte[]):AgentPassport
+getName():String
ClassLoaderObjectInputStream
-classLoader:ClassLoader= null
<< create >>+ClassLoaderObjectInputStream(classLoader:ClassLoader, in:InputStream):
#resolveClass(desc:ObjectStreamClass):Class
Packager
+packageAgent(agent:AgentInfo):byte[]
+unpackageAgent(packageFile:byte[]):AgentInfo
+getName():String
PackagerBase
#serializeAgent(agent:Agent):byte[]
#deseralizeAgent(data:byte[],classloader:ClassLoader):Agent
 
 
<< realize >>
 
Figure 6-8: Class diagram of the package packaging 
The .packaging-package, as illustrated in figure 6-8, is responsible for defining the 
interfaces which are used for serializing the agent to a byte stream and restore it when 
received. So called packagers as defined in the Packager interface are responsible for 
this. They are responsible for the whole process, which includes security checking and 
class-loader setup as well. This is necessary, because all the things are specific on how 
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an agent is packaged. However, the system should be built as modular as possible. This 
way the existing implementations are reuseable for other packagers and better maintain-
ability is achieved. For example, the agent's passport, which is described in the 
OpenPGP transport security chapter, is read by an AgentPassportReader. One can 
utilize this AgentPassportReader for all kinds of packaging standards, as long as the 
format of the passport is identical. 
Furthermore, for all cryptographic routines, one should use the corresponding Cry-
tographicProvider which can be obtained by using the CryptographicManager (see 
the description of the security-package for more information). 
Since most packagers will need to serialize the Agent's data into a byte-array, there ex-
ists a PackagerBase abstract class, which introduces and implements two new methods: 
serializeAgent and deserializeAgent. They are provided for convenience to take 
the serializable Agent, read the Agent's state and transform it into a byte-array. For this 
implementation the ClassLoaderObjectInputStream is used, which provides func-
tionality for this process. 
6.3.7 Package .resource 
Resource
+readLine():String
+getInputStream():InputStream
+getData():Object
+getURL():String
+getOutputStream():OutputStream
+hasMoreData():boolean
ResourceProvider
+getName():String
+createResource(resource:String,write:boolean,agentInfo:AgentInfo):Resource
+closeResource(res:Resource):void
+hasCreated(resource:Resource):boolean
ResourceList
+addResource(r:Resource):void
+closeResource(r:Resource):void
+closeAllResources():void
+getResource(index:int):Resource
+getResourceCount():int
+hasResource(resource:Resource):boolean  
Figure 6-9: Class diagram of the package resource 
In the .resource-package, all interfaces for managing the access of resources by agents 
are defined. This includes the ResourceProvider interface, which is responsible for 
creating and initializing Resource objects. A ResourceProvider has its own “proto-
col” like file:, mp3: or http: so that the agent simply accesses abstract resources in terms 
of a URL. By requesting a resource storage://mystorage the agent obtains a reference to 
a Resource object which it can use to read and/or write data to. The Resource interface 
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defines lots of access functions. This way, an agent may use streams to operate on the 
Resource or may read data line by line.  
For managing Resource objects, a ResourceList is specified, which can be used by all 
implementations which need to keep track of their resources. 
The class diagram of this package is provided in figure 6-9. 
6.3.8 Package .security 
CryptographicProvider
+isTrustedKey():boolean
+encrypt(data:byte[]):byte[]
+encryptAndSign(data:byte[]):byte[]
+decrypt(data:byte[]):byte[]
+isValidSignature(data:byte[]):boolean
+stripSignature(data:byte[]):byte[]
+getName():String
+importKey(key:byte[]):
+removeKey():void
+getHostKey
+setHostKey():void
+isKeyCertifiedBy():boolean
+canUseKey():boolean
Key SecurityPolicy
+maySendLocalMessage(m:Message):boolean
+maySendRemoteMessage(m:Message):boolean
+mayRequestResource(url:String):boolean
+mayRequestWritableResource(url:String):boolean
+mayUseHostDecryption():boolean
+mayEncryptToOwner():boolean
+mayVerifySignature(publickey:Key):boolean
+maySeeAgent(info:AgentInfo):boolean
+mayAccessService(servicename:String):boolean
+may(action:String):boolean
 
Figure 6-10: Class diagram of the package security 
In the .security-package, as illustrated in the class diagram in figure 6-10, all security 
relevant interfaces are grouped together. On the one hand these are cryptographic re-
lated interfaces like the CryptographicProvider and Key; on the other hand there are 
access-control related interfaces like SecurityPolicy. The .security-package is 
therefore a critical component of the framework. 
A CryptographicProvider serves as an interface for conducting all actions like sign-
ing, encrypting and decrypting data. The used keys are encapsulated in the interface 
Key. 
The SecurityPolicy is used to store permissions an agent has on the local system. It is 
queried by the AgentServices for the agent before fulfilling a request. 
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6.4 Control Flow 
6.4.1 Message Passing 
 
Figure 6-11: Sequence diagram for the message passing process 
Whenever an agent wants to send a message, it has to create a new Message object by 
using its AgentServices' createMessage-method. The AgentServices normally will 
delegate the request to the MessagingManager which will act as a Message-factory as 
well. The agent may then set a recipient and the data to be transferred and submit the 
message via the AgentServices as well. The AgentServices will set the sender of the 
message to the agent's name and consult the agent's SecurityPolicy, if the agent is 
allowed to send the message. Whether the message's recipient starts with “local:”, the 
SecurityPolicy has to be asked if a local message or a remote message may be sent. 
Afterwards, the Message simply gets passed to the MessagingManager. The Messag-
ingManager will pick the registered MessagingProvider for the recipients supported 
protocol and will submit the Message object to it. The MessagingProvider is then re-
sponsible for delivering the message. 
The whole process is illustrated in the sequence diagram shown in figure 6-11. 
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6.4.2 Resource Requests 
 
Figure 6-12: Sequence diagram for the resource request process 
Requests for local resources have to be conducted via the Agent's instance of Agent-
Services as well. The AgentServices have to check the agent's SecurityPolicy ob-
ject, whether the resource-request is allowed or not. If it is, the corresponding Resour-
ceProvider object can be obtained via one of the ResourceManager's getResource-
Provider-methods. The ResourceProvider can then be used to create a Resource 
object, which matches the request, by invoking its createResource-method. 
6.4.3 Agent Migration 
 
Figure 6-13: Sequence diagram for the agent migration process 
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A mobile agent can decide to travel to another host in the network. This is called migra-
tion. The agent therefore sends the migration-request to its AgentServices object. 
These are responsible for initiate the migration of the agent by delegate the migration-
request to the p2p-network, which can be looked up via the P2PManager. The network 
implementation is responsible to choose the Packager for the migration. The agent’s 
AgentInfo contains a reference to the Packager used to unpackage the Agent object 
and, if possible, should be used to package the agent again. The resulting byte-array can 
then be sent over the p2p-network, where the destination host is located. If the migra-
tion was successful, the AgentServices should return true to the Agent, otherwise 
they should indicate the failure via a false return value. The Agent object can then 
decide, if it ends its execution after the successful migration or if wants to go to another 
host as well etc. 
The complete process is illustrated in a sequence diagram in figure 6-13. 
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6.4.4 Agent Acceptance 
 
Figure 6-14: Sequence diagram for the agent acceptance process 
If a P2PNetwork object receives an incoming request to accept an agent, it has to pass 
the binary representation to a Packager object. This Packager can be obtained by the 
PackagingManager. The Packager will transform the given byte-array into an Agen-
tInfo object, which has a corresponding SecurityPolicy. The P2PNetwork has to set 
the reference to the Node, from which the agent came and can pass the AgentInfo ob-
ject to the Container in use. The passing is done in two steps: First, the AgentInfo has 
to be loaded, which means all management information structures are updated and the 
AgentInfo will be checked. The second step is the start of the agent, where the agent's 
execution will begin. 
The whole process is documented as a sequence diagram in figure 6-14. 
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6.5 Basic Implementation 
6.5.1 .container.impl.BasicContainer 
The BasicContainer provides a default execution environment for the system. It man-
ages incoming agents and provides notification for all registered listeners. The imple-
mentation uses the BasicMessageList, BasicAgentInfo and BasicAgentSer-
vices classes to manage all agent-related information. For all agents a seperate thread 
is started which executes the agents’ logic. 
All requests issued by an agent via its BasicAgentServices instance are delegated to 
the BasicContainer or to the corresponding manager. For instance, the createMes-
sage call is delegated to the MessagingManager. This way the BasicContainer can be 
used in very different scenarios if the required implementation is properly registered 
with their corresponding manager. 
6.5.2 .messaging.impl.BasicMessage 
The BasicMessage is a straight-forward implementation of the Message interface. It 
uses an internal byte-array to store the message's body and String objects for remem-
bering the sender and the recipient of the message. It accepts anything as the message's 
body without restrictions to the size. If this presents a problem and one wants to limit 
the size of the message's body, simply override setBody(byte[]). This is sufficient, 
since setBody(String) will forward the request to the overloaded method. The same is 
valid for checking for specific body contents, e.g. checking if a message is ACL com-
pliant or not: In either case BasicMessage can be subclassed and setBody(byte[]) 
overriden. 
6.5.3 .messaging.impl.BasicMessageList 
A BasicMessageList manages incoming messages in a Vector, whose reference is 
stored in the instance variable messages. Essentially all operations are simply mapped 
to the Vector's methods resulting in no method longer than three lines. This means that 
the BasicMessageList is simply an example for the adapter pattern to match the 
interface of the BasicMessageList to the Vector. 
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Note however, that the BasicMessageList does not have an upper limit for how many 
messages are stored, so that the list may consume too much memory, therefore being a 
target for denial-of-service attacks (DoS). 
6.5.4 .messaging.impl.LoopbackProvider 
The LoopbackProvider implements the local: protocol for message-passing. Every 
message which is addressed to a local recipient is routed to this provider and handed 
over to the Container in use. The LoopbackProvider will be registered automatically 
by the MessagingManager. If one wants to avoid this behaviour, one has to implement a 
new MessagingManager. 
6.5.5 .security.impl.GPGCryptographicProvider 
The GPGCryptographicProvider implements the OpenPGP standard for encryption 
and signing using the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, see GNUPG (2003)), available un-
der the General Public License26 (GPL). It is available for lots of platforms, including 
but not limited to Linux, Windows and Solaris. 
This implementation was done from scratch, because no free OpenPGP-compliant im-
plementation in Java™ was found. The only implementation found was one for the Mi-
crosoft .NET platform (see Kartmann (2003)). However, the object-design was very bad 
and not thread-safe. Therefore, this implementation is based on information from the 
man-page (see GNUPG (2002)), as well as from the accompanying documentation (see 
GNUPG (2003a)). 
GnuPG can read all data from STDIN and can be configured by the --status-fd pa-
rameter to print all status information to STDOUT. Specifying --batch as another op-
tion allows complete control of GnuPG by other programs. For forcing encryption to all 
keys, whether they are trusted or not, for the specific operations the parameter  
--always-trust is specified, which turns off all trust checks GnuPG normally per-
forms. 
The GPGCryptographicProvider class uses two private methods for supporting all 
calls to the GnuPG’s executable: runGPG and input2output 
private void Process runGPG(String arguments) 
                                                 
26 For more information about the GPL see FSF (2003) 
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private byte[] input2output(Process p, byte[] out, boolean waitForOut-
put) 
RunGPG takes a String as a parameter, which contains all options for calling GnuPG, 
appends the standard options --batch and --status-fd 1 to the command line and 
spawns a process which is returned as the method's return value. 
This process can be passed to the input2output method, which takes a process as the 
first argument, the data, which should be sent to the process, as the second argument 
and a boolean parameter, which specifies, whether the method should wait for the proc-
ess' output, as the third parameter. 
After it sends all the data to the process, it waits for the process to exit and checks the 
return code for success. If the process exited normally, all data is read from the process 
via a reader and parsed into lines. Normally, one would do this using a Buffere-
dReader, however the BufferedReader can not determine, if more data is available, so 
it was necessary to implement this in this method manually. All lines starting with 
[GNUPG:] are discarded, because they are GnuPG's status output. All other data is ap-
pended to a temporary StringBuffer which is converted using the UTF-827 standard to 
a byte-array. This byte-array is the return value from this method. UTF-8 has been cho-
sen because GnuPG's output is either UTF-8 or 7-Bit ASCII, which is compatible to 
UTF-8 for the represented character set. 
RunGPG and input2output are used in conjunction by the methods encrypt, en-
cryptAndSign, decrypt and isValidSignature with the corresponding parameters of 
GnuPG -ea --always-trust, --eas --always-trust and --decrypt --always-
trust. 
6.5.6 GPGKey 
GPGKey is the implementation of the Key interface for use with the GPGCrypto-
graphicProvider. Internally, the GPGKey holds a reference to the full key-fingerprint 
from which the key-id can be extracted. Whenever a GPGKey is used in conjunction with 
the GPGCryptographicProvider, the provider extracts the key-fingerprint and passes it 
to the GnuPG executable to reference the key. Therefore, the key has to be imported 
into the local key-ring first, which is required by the CryptographicProvider interface 
and therefore presents no problem. 
                                                 
27 UTF-8 is an encoding standard used to encode Unicode characters with one to three bytes, depending 
on the character. For the characters numbered 0 to 127 it is identical to the ASCII-standard 
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6.5.7 OpenPGPTransportPackager 
The OpenPGPTransportPackager is an implementation of the suggested OpenPGP-
Transport Security. It obtains the cryptographic provider for the OpenPGP standard 
from the CryptographicManager. Most likely, this will be the GPGCrypto-
graphicProvider. However, because of the loose coupling, one can introduce a new 
OpenPGP-compliant implementation by registering it with the CryptographicMan-
ager. 
The OpenPGPTransportPackager receives the byte-array and writes it into an tempo-
rary file onto the disk. The temporary file resides in the global temporary directory, 
which normally should be cleaned up by the operating system. Afterwards, it opens the 
file using the ZIP routines provided by the Java™ class library. It extracts all files speci-
fied by the OpenPGP-Transport Standard. All file locations are put to the AgentInfo so 
that the agent can be packaged again. 
The OpenPGPTransportPackager then uses the SecurityPolicyManager to let a secu-
rity-policy be assigned to the agent. The resulting AgentInfo object is then returned to 
the caller. 
6.5.8 OpenPGPTransportPassportReader 
The OpenPGPTransportPassportReader implements the logic for reading the pass-
ports as already described in the OpenPGP-Transport Standard. It verifies the passport’s 
signature and reads the security properties. 
This passport-reader can be used by all packagers wanting to read this kind of passports. 
6.5.9 AgentJarClassLoader 
The received classes have to be loaded into the JVM. For this, Java™ defines the 
Class-loader class. A special classloader has been implemented for loading agents 
from their corresponding Java™ archive. The classloader shields implementation 
classes from the framework, so that the agent cannot directly access any implementation 
circumventing the security-policies in use. 
For doing this, the classloader first tries to load classes from the given agent archive. 
Only if it cannot find the classes, it checks, if the agent may access the local class and 
then delegates the request to the system’s class-loader. 
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As a template the example classloader by Ken McCrary (McCrary (2000)) was used and 
customized to the special requirements from loading classes of the agent archive first. 
This classloader can be used by all packagers which need to load agents from Java™ 
archives. 
6.6 Possible Improvements 
The framework itself is consistent and very flexible, so that it is possible to implement 
all kinds of p2p-networks based on mobile agent technology on top of it. However, the 
basic implementations are, as the name suggests, only rudimentary implementations, 
which can be implemented better according to the scenario. This chapter shows specific 
problems of the implementations in certain situations and how they can be solved. 
6.6.1 Defend against Denial of Service Attacks 
“On the Internet, a denial of service (DoS) attack is an incident in which a user or or-
ganization is deprived of the services of a resource they would normally expect to have. 
Typically, the loss of service is the inability of a particular network service, such as e-
mail, to be available or the temporary loss of all network connectivity and services.” 
(Whatis?com (2003)) 
This means the purpose of a denial of service attack (DoS) is to disrupt the functionality 
of a system. The BasicContainer is vulnerable to this kind of attacks, because it can 
not limit the memory consumption of an agent. In theory, an agent can request all the 
memory available to the JVM thus blocking all other operations of the p2p-client, as 
shown in this example: 
public void start() 
{ 
 Vector v = new Vector(); 
 while(true) 
 { 
  // request 1 MB per turn 
  v.add(new byte[1024*1024]); 
 } 
} 
Another problem is an agent which will not cease its execution if it is told to do so, thus 
occupying threads and probably blocking the space for other agents, if the number of 
agents is limited on a peer. This can be accomplished by using a single endless loop: 
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public void start() 
{ 
 while(true); 
} 
The latter problem has been addressed by simply killing the agent through the 
Thread.stop-method. Unfortunately, this method has been deprecated, because it may 
cause damage to the Sun Microsystems’ ™ implementation of the JVM. There are other 
JVMs available, but the implementation of Sun Microsystems™ is the one most used. 
Furthermore, the deprecation status means, that the method may be removed in any fu-
ture Java™ API specification without further notice. 
A solution to this problem would be the use of a new JVM-instance for each agent. The 
JVM can be limited in memory consumption and can be killed like any normal task by 
the operating system. However, spawning a JVM for each agent is very slow. Further-
more, all management, like resource providers, network management etc. would reside 
in one thread, while the agents are running in others, so inter-process communication 
has to be used to communicate. Remote Method Invocation (RMI) or sockets can be 
used for this, but both are imposing further performance penalty and are complicating 
the implementation. 
However, this can be avoided in scenarios, where code can be trusted. For instance, the 
BasicContainer can be used without problems, if it is possible to only accept code by 
a trustworthy programmer, e.g. the programmer's certificate is used. 
Note that the problem exists in all method calls to an agent, not only in the start-method. 
For example during de-serializing an agent can block the system as well with an endless 
loop in its writeObject and readObject-methods. 
69 
7 Implementation Suggestions & Examples 
7.1 Broad- und Multicasting of Messages 
Broad- and multicasting can be implemented in two ways: The easiest solution is the 
use of a relay-agent, where other agents can get registered by sending a special message. 
Afterwards, registered agents can send specially prepared messages to the relay-agent, 
which in turn sends them to all other registered agents.  
The other solution is the use of a virtual protocol. A new messaging protocol can be 
registered. This protocol is a virtual protocol that means that there is not real p2p proto-
col or local message delivering protocol associated with it. In fact, this protocol does 
not send any message on its own, but will forward all messages to the given groups par-
ticipants. For example, it would be possible to create a virtual protocol, which is imple-
mented in a way, that a message, addressed to broadcast:agents, will be sent to all local 
agents.  
The first, agent-based approach is suitable for a dynamic group, that means, groups 
where other agents can join and which exists only for a short period. For example, this 
approach is very good for building discussion groups (for agents or humans) where in-
terested parties can subscribe and after the meeting, the relay-agent dies. Furthermore, 
this approach works bidirectional for agents distributed over multiple peers, as long as 
they are allowed to send messages to remote agents. 
The second, protocol-based, approach is suited to long-life groups or groups with fixed 
participants. It works more transparently than the agent-based approach. However, only 
local agents can send messages, because the protocol is only accessible on the same 
node. But relaying messages to remote agents is not a problem; that way, remote com-
munication is only unidirectional. 
7.2 Custom packagers 
A custom packager has to implement the interface .packaging.Packager. This inter-
face is very simple, because it only contains two method definitions for converting an 
agent into a byte-array and vice versa. However, the implementation of such packagers 
is even more cumbersome, because a packager has wide variations of responsibility: It 
has to implement the specified transport standard, extract and verify the class files, read 
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all security attributes, make security checks, install its own class loader and finally in-
stantiate the agent. 
Most of this functionality can be written quite modular and often existing implementa-
tions, which suit the needs for each subtask, can be used. For example, for reading an 
agent-passport, there is an interface PassportReader and there is already an implemen-
tation to read the passports used by the OpenPGP Transport. If the new standard uses 
the same passports, this passport-reader can be reused. 
Cryptographic routines are commonly used by the custom packagers as well. The im-
plementations should acquire a reference to cryptographic providers through the corre-
sponding CryptographicManager, thereby reusing code and further decoupling the 
system.  
The same applies to the classloaders: Packagers normally will have to read classes from 
Java™-archives. For this, they can use the AgentJarClassloader implementation 
found in the framework or use existent class loaders. The only thing a classloader 
should really take care of is the fact that the agent should not be allowed to load arbi-
trary classes. For example the framework's classloader blocks everything except 
java.lang and the framework's interfaces. During the application initialization, the new 
packager has to be registered with the PackagingManager. Afterwards it is usable by 
the p2p-network as well as the container etc. 
7.3 Custom resource-providers 
For every resource-type tat the agent wants to access, like files, databases etc., a re-
source-provider has to be registered in the system. The interface ResourceProvider must 
be implemented, which means methods for opening and closing resources have to be 
written. These methods must return Resource objects, which are used for actually ac-
cessing the data. For instance, to build a resource-provider for files, simply create a fac-
tory for the Resources where a FileInputStream or FileOutputStream is encapsu-
lated. Note, that there are several methods to obtain data from a Resource object, like 
getting lines or a stream. 
Implementing a resource-provider is therefore quite easy, because it normally only 
means wrapping existing APIs. However, it must be assured, that a read-only resource 
is really only readable, because otherwise the whole security concept does not work. For 
an example HTTPResourceProvider see the example application at the end of this 
document. 
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7.4 Peer-to-Peer-Network 
Designing a well-scaling p2p-network implementation is a very difficult task. However, 
integrating it into the framework is quite easy. Normally one can develop the p2p-
network independently, that means one will develop an implementation which can dis-
cover nodes, manage connections and send packages. The only thing to do is to build a 
wrapper to the P2PNetwork interface which defines more specific packet-types like one 
for a message or for an agent. 
The P2PNetwork implementation has to send these packets over the network. On the 
other side, the implementation has to decide, whether it received a message or an agent. 
If it received a message, it has to convert the message's receiver and sender from the 
network representation to the application's naming convention. Most notably, it has to 
use the local:-protocol for local entities. Afterwards, it can simply call the Messaging-
Manager to send and route the message. 
If it received an agent, the process is a little bit more complex: It has to put all the agent 
data into a byte-array. Afterwards it has to obtain a reference to the corresponding 
Packager object. This reference can be obtained by the PackagingManager. Note that 
it is necessary to specify the format the Packager should understand. This is necessary, 
because the format is either defined by the implemented p2p-network standard or it is 
transmitted with the agent data. Either way, the p2p-network implementation is the only 
instance which can decide which packager must be used. Using the packager, the agent 
can be unpackaged, resulting in an AgentInfo object. This object can be inserted into 
the container in use, which can be obtained via the ContainerManager. If the agent is 
running, the result or failure information can be transmitted back to the other peer in the 
network. 
Furthermore, the network's peers have to be published to the application, allowing 
agents to decide, to which peer they want to travel. This is done by exposing objects, 
which implement the Node interface. Normally, the Node interface is implemented by an 
object that is only a wrapper around the real node's network address and forwarding 
method requests, like if a node is online etc., to the p2p-network implementation. 
7.5 Itinerary protection scheme 
For use in a more sophisticated application, the itineraries, i.e. the path the agent travels, 
can be protected via various methods. A very sophisticated one is part of the MARISM-
A security-architecture (see Robles (2002)). MARISM-A is designed to secure the Jade 
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platform, but the same protection scheme can easily be implemented using this frame-
work. 
The protection scheme is based on a stub agent, which carries classes as instance data. 
The classes are encrypted to the corresponding host-keys. On every host the stub-agent 
determines on which host it runs and passes the encrypted class files data to a service. 
This service verifies if the right agent accesses the classes, by checking hash-values of 
the agent's code against one appended to the classes to be loaded. This way, it can be 
assured, that no one tampered with the agent in transit.  
The implementation in this framework can be quite easy: The hash-values can be calcu-
lated by a custom packager during the receive process of the agent. The agent may re-
quest a new service, e.g. named AgentClassLoaderService, which is registered in the 
system through the ServiceManager, to decrypt the classes and return a new class 
loader for them. In turn, The AgentClassLoaderService can check the agent's passport 
for the hash-values and is therefore able to check the decryption attempt. 
7.6 Offline Applications 
With the rise of new, small and mobile devices connecting to the Internet, new applica-
tions are possible, like initiating searches for accommodation, traffic information etc., if 
someone is on the road. However, traffic and connection fees are still very high, so that 
it is necessary to reduce the amount of data sent from and to the devices and the time the 
devices are connected to the network. Sometimes it is even necessary or likely that a 
device or another node is not connected all the time to the network which is needed to 
accomplish the tasks. In either case, mobile agents can be used to develop applications, 
where the initiating node does not need to be online all the time. Instead, the owner 
sends a mobile agent, which roams the network for the desired information. After all 
information is collected, there are two possible implementations, which are applicable 
under different scenarios: 
1. The agent waits on a node somewhere in the network until the initiating node comes 
online again. If the node, where the agent waits, goes down, the agent has to look for 
another node to wait. However, it might be to slow to do this or for other reasons, the 
node goes down without notifying the agent and all information is lost. 
2. The agent stops at a node, where a special resource-provider is installed. This pro-
vider offers a persistent storage for agents. For example, it can offer 500 Kbytes to 
certified agents. This way, an agent may request a resource like agent-
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data://somename. The ResourceProvider, for example named AgentData, has to be 
registered before with the ResourceManager. This resource-manager will then be 
used to provide the resource, if the security-policy for the agent allows the use of this 
resource-type. The agent gets a reference to a Resource object and can use it to write 
its results to. These results can be fetched by the initiating node via another agent or 
by special messages exchanged between the nodes. If the storage is always online, 
like it is provided by a service provider, this method is safer than the first one. How-
ever, it needs write access to resources, which may be a problem in public networks. 
7.7 Agent-Supported Download Applications 
P2P-File-sharing-applications are quite popular today. However, they depend on search-
ing the network via broadcasts and trusting the unauthenticated and invalidated results, 
which are coming back. By using mobile agents, it is possible to verify the results and 
only send them back, if they really match the search results or other given criteria. 
Therefore, they can travel to the node, which offers that source, read the data and vali-
dates it. Afterwards it needs to send the data to its owner. This can be accomplished by 
giving an agent a unique job-number. When the agent is initiated, it receives this job-
number. Furthermore, a ContainerMessageListener is registered with the Container 
object in use, which intercepts all messages and saves the contents of those, who start 
with the job-number, to an associated file. The agent can therefore simply send the veri-
fied data to its owner's host-address including the job-number, so that the owner’s host 
is able to handle the incoming data. 
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8 Anonymizer Sample-Application 
8.1 Application's focus 
As part of this project, a sample application is provided, which utilizes the framework 
for implementing an anonymizing service, which is based on mobile agents. This way 
the functionality and the design of the framework can be demonstrated. 
The sample application's purpose is to anonymize web requests, issued by an ordinary 
web browser. This is done via mobile agents, which are issued for each request and are 
roaming the p2p-network to anonymously fetch the requested data for the user. 
8.2 Anonymizing traffic 
Today more and more people are using the Internet, especially the World Wide Web 
(WWW). Many things are conducted digitally, including e-commerce and information 
gathering. However, each packet of data sent in the Internet contains the sender’s 
unique address. Defined in the Internet Protocol (IP) this address is a 32 bit number 
which is assigned to a computer and every other device connected to the Internet. Be-
cause most computers are only used by one person at a time, the IP address not only 
correlates to the computer but also to the user. 
This way it is possible to create user profiles by analysing the generated traffic. For ex-
ample website operators are able to analyse logs and secret services are capable of cap-
turing and analysing networking traffic in central routing points. This practice conflicts 
with the right of privacy that citizens in modern democracies enjoy. 
To re-establish privacy in the digital era, traffic needs to be anonymized. This is often 
done by sending it randomly through the network, getting relayed at each computer it 
passes. Thereby the original source address can be obscured because each computer 
retransmits the packet and thereby places its IP address in the packet. 
Systems working like this are called mixnets. Mixnets are networks, in which messages 
are routed randomly between the nodes to obscure the senders’ original addresses by 
making traffic analysis harder. Since each node only knows from  
However, issuing a request anonymously is not as difficult as returning the request's 
result anonymously as well, because for this the request's source needs to be known and 
therefore needs to be stored somewhere. 
75 
8.3 Application flow 
The request from the web-browser is sent to the proxy-server which is a node in the 
p2p-network at the same time. For each page or graphic that the browser requests, a 
request-id is generated. Afterwards the connection is saved with this id. A new agent is 
spawn which gets the request-id and the URL it should fetch. Upon start-up the agent 
initializes a list of nodes it travelled to. This list contains a random-length initialisation, 
which consists of valid host-names in the p2p-network. Since this list has only valid 
names and has a random length, the real origin of the agent cannot be determined by 
looking on this list. 
The agent then proceeds by visiting a randomly chosen number of hosts. At each host, it 
adds the host-name to its host-list. 
On the last node the agent issues the request for the URL it has to fetch. The data are 
stored within the payload reference and the agent will go back its internal host-list, get-
ting the previous host, it has visited and will request migration to that host. On each host 
the agent will try to deliver the data. This is done by requesting a resource named re-
turn://requestid. If the resource is found, the request has been issued by that host and the 
agent will write the data to the obtained resource. The stream of the resource is directly 
connected to the socket of the connection to the browser. This way the agent will write 
its response directly to the browser. 
If the resource could not be found, the agent travels back down the list until it reaches 
its origin. If one host is down, it will be skipped and the agent will proceed to the previ-
ous one in the list. This way, it does not matter, if one host in the list is down, unless it 
is the originating node. If this happens, the agent will reach the list's end and will quit 
execution. 
8.4 Application's implementation 
8.4.1 Package structure 
The package structure of the anonymizer-application is based on the framework's struc-
ture. The main package for the application is 
de.tuclausthal.informatik.winf.anonymizer. 
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If sub-packages to this package are referenced in the following, a dot “.” is prefixed, 
that means: 
.packaging is de.tuclausthal.informatik.winf.anonymizer.packaging. 
The packages .agent, .p2p, .packaging and .resource hold the implementation to 
the interfaces in the corresponding packages of the framework. In the .gui-package the 
complete graphical user interface (GUI) for the anonymizer is stored. The .proxy-
package contains the implementation of the proxy-server part of the application. 
8.4.2 Proxy-Server 
A proxy-server is a server which accepts requests from clients and tries to fetch the 
given data. It operates on the application-layer of the ISO/OSI layer model28 and is 
therefore able to understand the data transferred from and to the client. Because of this, 
it is possible to filter content, for example block sex sites within a company. Another 
advantage of proxy-servers is that requests can be cached and then served from the ca-
che, if multiple clients access the same resources, like web pages. 
A proxy-server is configured within the browsers for proxy-servers serving web-pages 
via the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). By pointing the browser to the anonymizer, 
the anonymizer is able to know which page should be fetched. 
The proxy-server's implementation is very simple: One object of the built-in class 
ServerSocket is instantiated and bound to port 8080. The incoming requests by a web-
browser are then accepted. HTTP requests are looking like this: 
GET http://www.tu-clausthal.de/ HTTP/1.0 
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg 
Accept: application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/nvd.ms-excel 
Accept: application/msword 
Accept-Language: en-us 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT 5.0) 
From this whole request only the unified resource locator (URL) of the first line is used 
and passed over to a new agent. In this case, this is http://www.tu-clausthal.de/. All 
other information, like browser identification or cookies, are discarded, because they 
can be used to track the user's session. Along with the URL the agent gets a newly gen-
erated ID, which is used to identify the connection with the browser. This connection is 
stored inside a HashMap and can be retrieved using the connection's ID. 
                                                 
28 The ISO/OSI model is described by Tanenbaum (Tanenbaum (2000)) 
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Because spawning a new agent is not much slower than spawning a new thread and the 
proxy-server will only be accessed by one user, the server itself is not multi-threaded.  
The proxy-server's source is located in the class ProxyServer in the package .proxy. 
The proxy-server registers a new resource-provider in the system, which handles all 
URLs of the type return. This resource-provider is implemented via an inner-class.  
8.4.3 Anonymizing Agent 
The request is handed over from the proxy-server to an agent. The agent is responsible 
to fetch the data. For this, the agent initializes itself at the first start. To determine, if 
initialization is necessary, the agent checks its instance variable mustInit. If this variable 
is true, the agent initializes itself, by proceeding in its init-method: 
protected void init(AgentServices agentServices) 
{ 
 if (!this.mustInit) 
  return; 
 
 // random route 
 String[] neighboringNodes = agentServices.getNeighborNodes(); 
 
 if (neighboringNodes != null && neighboringNodes.length > 0) 
 { 
  this.hopsToGo = (int) (Math.random() * MAX_HOPS) + 1; 
 
  // init with fake data 
  int fakeCount = (int) (Math.random() * 30); 
  for (int i = 0; i < fakeCount; i++) 
  { 
   this.hosts.add( 
    neighboringNodes[(int) 
     (Math.random() * neighboringNodes.length)]); 
  } 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  // rarely happens: no neighbors 
  this.hopsToGo = 1; 
 } 
 
 // last entry ever is our host 
 this.hosts.add(agentServices.getNodeName()); 
 this.mustInit = false; 
} 
This method constructs a faked initial travel-list for this agent to obscure the real owner. 
To get valid host-names, a list containing all neighbour-nodes is requested from the sys-
tem. Names from this list are taken to put a random number of fake-entries at the top of 
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the list. Additionally the hopsToGo instance-variable is initialized with a random value, 
which must not exceed the compile-time constant MAX_HOPS.  If no neighbouring peers 
are available, the agent falls back to unanonymized mode. That means that the hop-
sToGo-field is simply initialized with 1. 
After the initialization is guaranteed the agent determines if it is in forward- or in back-
ward-movement by looking at its payload-data. 
If the payload is a null-reference, the agent is in forward-movement and checks, if it 
has to go to further hosts. If it must, it chooses one random neighbour host, adds it to its 
list and travels there. It does so until it successfully migrates to another host. This be-
haviour is implemented in the moveForward-method and called from the agent's start-
method. If the agent has to get the data, because the hopsToGo-field is zero, the agent 
requests the data by acquiring the corresponding resource via its AgentServices' in-
stance and saves it in a field named payload. This is implemented in the method named 
readData. 
In backward-movement the agent tries to deliver its data on the current host. This is 
done by requesting a resource with the given request-id. If this fails the agent chooses 
the next host from its list and migrates there and proceeds. If the resource could be 
opened successfully, the agent writes its entire payload to that resource and terminates. 
The backward-movement is implemented in the method moveBackward and the at-
tempts to deliver the data in the method named deliverData. 
8.4.4 Peer-to-Peer-Implementation 
The p2p-network implementation is designed to support static p2p-networks that means 
that nodes neither join the network nor leave it. All peers should be available at all time. 
Because of this assumption, the implementation is very clean and well-suited to demon-
strate how to implement a p2p-network. 
The p2p-implementation is available in the SimpleP2P class and the corresponding 
SimpleP2PNode class in the .p2p-package. 
When going online, the p2p-network opens a socket on port 4444 using a Server-
Socket object. Incoming connections will be handled via a separate thread. The thread's 
logic is implemented in the run-method of the SimpleP2P class. The SimpleP2P-
protocol is thereby defined as following: 
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The first transmitted byte contains the command. The command codes can be seen in 
table 8-1. 
Code Command 
0x00 COMMAND_PING: Requests that the other node an-
swers with OK. All data sent with this command have to 
be discarded. 
0x01 COMMAND_AGENT: An agent will be sent in the data 
and should be unpackaged and run. 
0x02 COMMAND_MESSAGE: Reserved for future support 
of message-passing over the P2P-network. 
Tab. 8-1 Command-codes of the Simple-P2P networking protocol 
After the command, four bytes are transferred for the data length. Afterwards the data 
accompanying the command and are therefore command-specific are sent. For each 
command the result code is returned to the initiator. Afterwards the connection is 
closed. The incoming data is read according to the protocol by the p2p-network imple-
mentation and actions are taken depending on the command. The command’s result is 
then sent back to the sender. It may be 0x00 for OK and 0x01 for indicating an error. 
For example, agents are unpackaged or sent to another peer. For each command a new 
connection is opened which is closed afterwards. 
8.4.5 Agent Migration 
Agents are migrated by only sending their state to improve the overall system's speed. 
Since only one kind of agent type exists in the system, this is sufficient and reduces the 
amount of data which is sent over the network significantly. To achieve this, a new 
packager has been implemented, which is called StateOnlyPackager. This packager 
simply stores the class name of the agent to instantiate and its serialized state into a 
large package, which can then be used to restore the agent on another peer. The 
StateOnlyPackager is derived from the abstract class PackagerBase from the frame-
work, which offers routines for serializing the state of agents, so that the implementa-
tion is quite easy and straightforward. The unpackaging for example is completely done 
in the following method: 
8.4.6 Resource-Provider for HTTP 
The agents need to fetch the web pages. For this HTTP is used. To offer the agents the 
access to web-pages, a new resource-provider has been included in the application, 
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which handles HTTP requests. The agent simply opens a URL, like 
http://www.server.com, and gets a resource as a return value. This resource contains all 
of the HTTP response, including the header. That way, this data can be send to the 
browser when the agent delivers the data without any conversion. The resource-provider 
itself is very simple, since it only works as a factory for HTTPResource objects. The 
main work is done within the class HTTPResource: It opens a connection to the server 
specified in the URL and requests the data. This implementation does not use the 
Java™ HTTP handling classes but instead uses its own socket to preserve the original 
HTTP header sent by the server. The data is fetched in the constructor call: 
HTTPResource(String url) 
{ 
 this.url = url; 
 
 try 
 { 
  // only for parsing 
  URL tempURL = new URL(url); 
 
  // get port 
  int port = tempURL.getPort(); 
  if (port < 0) 
    port = 80; 
  // get port to computer 
  this.socket = new Socket(tempURL.getHost(), port); 
  // encapsulate response 
  this.inputStream = this.socket.getInputStream(); 
 
  // write HTTP Command 
  OutputStream out = this.socket.getOutputStream(); 
  out.write( 
   ("GET " 
    + tempURL.getPath() 
    + "?" 
    + tempURL.getQuery() 
    + " HTTP/1.0\nHost:" 
    + tempURL.getHost() 
    + "\n\n") 
    .getBytes()); 
 
  // wait for all data to arrive 
  int data = 0; 
  ByteArrayOutputStream tempOut = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
  while(data != -1) 
  { 
   data = -1; 
   try 
   { 
    if(this.inputStream.available() > 0) 
    { 
     byte[] buf = new 
byte[this.inputStream.available()]; 
     this.inputStream.read(buf); 
     tempOut.write(buf); 
    } 
    data = this.inputStream.read(); 
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   } catch(IOException e) {} 
 
   if(data != -1) tempOut.write((byte)(data & 0xFF)); 
  } 
  this.inputStream = new ByteArrayInput-
Stream(tempOut.toByteArray()); 
 } 
 catch (Throwable e) 
 { 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
  return; 
 } 
} 
The HTTP resource-provider only supports HTTP GET commands. That means that 
most web-forms will not work with the anonymizer. However, such forms often require 
the authentication of the user, so this is not a big disadvantage. 
8.5 Application Usage 
8.5.1 Configuring the network 
The p2p-network is statically configured and initialized during the start-up of the appli-
cation. This implementation is not able to determine its neighbours automatically. 
Therefore, all peers have to be entered into a text-file in the applications working direc-
tory. The file is named hosts.txt and contains one host per line. The host can be given 
either as an IP address in the form aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd (e.g. 192.168.1.1) or as a DNS name 
(e.g. computer.domain.com). All lines starting with a hash-sign (“#”) are considered as 
comments and are ignored. An example hosts.txt file can look like this: 
# hosts.txt 
# part of the Anonymizer 
192.168.54.1 
mickey.intranet.daniel-luebke.de 
neo.intranet.daniel-luebke.de 
Note, that the application reads this file during start-up. If the user wants to edit his 
neighbour-list he has to stop and restart the anonymizer. 
8.5.2 Starting and using the application 
The anonymizer-application can be started by using the JRE with the following com-
mand: 
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java -jar anonymizer.jar 
This tells the JRE to launch the application packaged in the archive named ano-
nymizer.jar. The application will automatically start all services and presents a GUI, in 
which he is able to control and monitor his p2p-client. 
The GUI is organized within four tabs, which can be seen in figure 8-3. 
 
Figure 8-1: The anonymizer application 
The first tab has buttons to control the software: It allows the connection and disconnec-
tion from the network. 
The second tab contains the proxy-log. The proxy-log lists all URLs which have been 
requested and served by this p2p-node. 
The third tab displays the agents' status-changes. Whenever an agent starts or stops 
within the local system, this change will be logged here. 
The last tab shows, which agents are currently running on the system. This can be used 
to see the load on the system. To not negatively affect the performance by refreshing 
this display, a refresh-button is placed at the bottom of this tab. By pressing this button, 
the user can refresh the list of actively running agents on the system. 
By closing this window or choosing “Exit” from the menu “File”, the application can be 
terminated, including the shutdown of all network activity. 
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9 Conclusions and Outlook 
The objectives of this project are to provide a framework, which is a solid foundation 
for the development of an open p2p-network. The final p2p-network should be powered 
by mobile agents to distribute logic and avoid frequent updates of software. It has to 
incorporate strong security-measures to defend against attacks concerning the privacy 
and the data of the users. 
Therefore, the first step was to develop a security model which can protect agents and 
their state in an open network. The resulting OpenPGP Transport Standard is very flexi-
ble and allows the inclusion of further security properties if necessary through the use of 
an agent-passport. For being useful in completely decentrally organized networks or 
within environments where autonomity is necessary, the key-validation process is done 
decentrally allowing its use in such cases. This has been achieved by using the 
OpenPGP standard for encryption and digital signatures. 
The second step was to develop the framework which will capture the design for the 
client-software of the p2p-network. This objective was solved by gathering the require-
ments of the applications based upon the framework. Afterwards, these requirements 
where transferred into a complete framework-design. The resulting framework has a 
very flexible design, in which functionality domains are independent of each other. Be-
cause of this it is no problem to independently develop parts of the p2p-network and put 
them together afterwards. Some further ideas for applications and specific problems and 
how to solve them using the framework were given to complete the framework’s de-
scription. 
The third objective was to provide a sample application. This application has demon-
strated that the framework design can be used to efficiently implement agent-powered 
p2p-applications with minimal effort. Furthermore, the flexibility of the design has been 
shown by replacing the packager and inserting a new p2p-network implementation 
without any modifications of the system. The sample application is important for an-
other reason as well: It shows how to gain anonymity within applications based on the 
framework. The anonymity is independent of the p2p-implementation because all of the 
logic is implemented in the agent. All that is required is that the used packager does not 
place properties in the transferred agents by which the owner can be identified. 
Finally, the sample application demonstrates that this framework is a solid foundation. 
Future development should concentrate on a scalable p2p-implementation and should 
deal with the defence against denial-of-service attacks.  
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P2P-implementations of other projects can possibly be re-used for this. For example, 
Sun Microsystems™ offers the JXTA framework for p2p-applications. Other popular 
protocols like the Gnutella or the Freenet29 protocol could be extended to support mobile 
agents as well. A new implementation based on newer research results could be used to 
compare performance. 
After developing and including the best scalable p2p-implementation, the resulting net-
work will be able to allow the safe use of distributed resources and will offer unmatched 
functionality and use-cases. This is possible because each user can insert his own logic 
into the network by writing and deploying his own agents. Examples and possible sce-
narios were given in the seventh chapter. It is possible to move all of today’s existent 
p2p-services to the new network, including instant messaging, file-sharing and distrib-
uted computing. 
Note that for interoperability the framework supports multiple p2p-implementations to 
connect to, so that beside the main-protocol the software will be able to connect to other 
networks as well. 
Further research is needed in the areas of security. This especially includes dealing with 
malicious hosts in an open p2p-network and replay-attacks which are not yet covered by 
the security mechanisms presented in this work. While the problem of malicious hosts 
has not been solved even in closed networks, it is unlikely that a solution will be found 
soon. Because of this, actions limiting the impact of malicious hosts would be interest-
ing to investigate and implement. The latter problem of replay-attacks can be solved by 
including serial numbers. Further approaches have been developed for predefined itin-
eraries and can possibly be ported to the framework and the open network environment. 
An implementation of a container, which is capable of further restricting the agents by 
spawning new JVMs instead of threads, would be interesting in terms of performance 
and reliability. This type of implementation could be used to defend against DoS-
attacks. 
All in all the combination of mobile agents and p2p-networks is a very interesting ap-
proach for enhancing today’s networks and integrating different services into one com-
mon platform. The framework developed in this project provides a solid foundation 
which should be used to implement the mentioned functionality and can be used for 
further research to resolve the open questions.  
 
                                                 
29 The Freenet project home page is http://freenet.sourceforge.net/ 
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